.

In the eyes of the outside world, Du Xiaolei's diplomatic statement is not tough enough.

It’s not that the Foreign Minister is not tough enough, but that the Chinese leadership has great differences on whether to fight or to reconcile. At the high-level meeting that afternoon, Yi Yuanchao and Li Pingko fought red. The main difference between the two was not whether to fight, but whether they had the ability to fight.

Although Yi Yuandao is the leader of the peace faction, his views on whether to fight are similar to those of the Li Pinggang, that is, Vietnam crosses the bottom line and war is inevitable. However, in his opinion, China is not able to launch a large-scale war against a country with more than 100 million people, and Vietnam has only issued a statement and has not taken substantial actions. China has no reason to declare war on Vietnam for the time being.

Li Pingko's attitude was more direct: not only should we fight, but we should also take action immediately.

At the end of the argument, the two must face a realistic question: What to use to fight this war?

To put it bluntly, it is the war funding.

The budget for the fiscal year 2030 to 2031 has long been passed. Even if Li Pingke uses it and reduces unnecessary expenses, it will only have a surplus of 500 billion yuan at most. This amount of money is not enough for a small-scale war, let alone a large-scale war. There is no money to fight a war. The war expenses are expected to be around 3 trillion yuan, and half of them must be paid in the same year. There is a trillion yuan gap, and Li Pingke must solve this problem.

It must be admitted that Li Pingko is a very talented prime minister.

In the eyes of many people, he has no choice but to obtain financing through the central bank's issuance of currencies and then use treasury bonds and war bonds.

If this is true, it will definitely be opposed by Yi Yuanchao.

The reason is simple: By the beginning of 2030, China's government bonds exceeded 30 trillion yuan, equivalent to twice the annual fiscal revenue of the central government, and had already exceeded the warning line. Including the bonds issued by local governments, state-owned enterprises, and central departments, the total debt amount exceeded 60 trillion yuan, which was 80% of the GDP in 2029. Although this proportion is not high, far below the United States, the liquidity of the RMB is far less than that of the United States. China's actual debt burden is much higher than that of the United States, and the risk of debt is much greater.

Issuing additional debts is equivalent to shaking the foundation.

In fact, this is completely opposite to the direction of Li Pingko's rule over the years.

After becoming Prime Minister, Li Pingko has been working hard to reduce the national debt level and achieved remarkable results. In the seven years after 2022, except for the government's debt burden increased in 2027 and 2028, affected by the First Indian Ocean War, the government's debt burden was reduced in the other five years. In 2026, it dropped to the lowest level since 2014. The overall debt burden was only 45% of the GDP, which is not only far lower than the United States, but is 17 percentage points lower than the EU, which has always focused on controlling debt levels.

The government's reduction of debt levels is equivalent to reducing the money supply. In the context of large-scale over-issuance of currencies, it is equivalent to controlling inflation, enhancing the consumption capacity of the people, thereby promoting more effective economic development and fundamentally improving the retention rate of the RMB.

It can be said that this has played a very significant role in economic development.

At this time, there will definitely be risks in issuing additional currency.

Although three trillion war debts are nothing compared to the total amount of debts of 60 trillion, three trillion national debts and three trillion war debts are nothing, no one can guarantee that three trillion can win a protracted large-scale war, and after winning the war, there is still a heavy burden.

This means that debt is likely to get out of control during the war.

From the perspective of economic development, this is tantamount to seeking death.

Fortunately, Li Pingkoo did not make any plans on debt, but proposed a brand new solution: use state-owned assets to obtain loans.

This approach avoids a crucial issue: additional currency issuance.

If the government issues bonds directly, the central bank will increase the issuance of money, increase liquidity, and obtain loans from private banks, which is equivalent to utilizing private capital and will not increase the issuance of money. Although doing so will also increase the burden of government debt, the debt can be repaid with war dividends.

The so-called "war dividend" is the broad development prospect of the Indochina Peninsula.

According to Li Pingko, after the war is over, the government can repay the war loans through administrative guarantees without spending a penny on it.

Obviously, this is very tempting.

Although Yi Yuanda still opposed the war immediately, he could not provide a better reason for opposition.

It must be admitted that Li Pingkoo made sufficient preparations and when he made this proposal, he had contacted several banks and obtained private capital support.

At that time, at least five large private banks were willing to provide war loans to the government.

In the documents submitted by Li Pingko, the five private banks have promised war loans of 5 trillion yuan, and they promised to double the upper limit when necessary.

If you use ten trillion to fight a war, your chances of winning will not be too small.

Since Yi Yuandao no longer objected, Li Pingko's proposal for war was no longer obstructed.

Obviously, Yi Yuanchao was a head of state who did not understand the economy very much and ignored a crucial issue, namely whether the repayment method mentioned by Li Pingko was effective.

Although the administrative guarantees provided by the government have a certain value and can be used to repay loans, the government has used shares of state-owned enterprises as collateral before this. To put it bluntly, if the repayment method proposed by Li Pingkoo cannot be fulfilled, the shares of state-owned enterprises must be transferred.

It is obvious that Li Pingko used this war to kick off the "denationalization era".

After nearly four hours of discussion, in the final vote, the resolution to declare war on Vietnam was narrowly passed, and then entered the war discussion stage.

Huang Zhibo did not show off, but gave the opportunity to Mu Haoyang.

Because the main participants were senior leaders, and few of them could understand military issues, Mu Haoyang tried to simplify the complex issues and only emphasized that the war would be carried out in stages.

The entire report only took half an hour and did not delay much time.

After the war plan was approved, the meeting ended.

At 10:00 p.m. on May 3, 2030, Beijing time, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that he would issue a major diplomatic announcement on the morning of May 4.

Now, the whole world became nervous.

In the afternoon, a TV station had already reported that Chinese senior officials were holding a meeting and it was very likely to discuss whether to take this opportunity to declare war on Vietnam.

Although China did not officially release news, the signs of war were very obvious.

In the evening, the latest map of the military deployment and mobilization situation in the southwest China appeared on the Internet. The Chinese Air Force and Navy are sending additional combat aircraft to the southwest region. Subsequently, several Western TV stations reported that the "Huangdi" aircraft carrier, which had been stationed in Dalian, had already left the port. Because the "Yangtze River" and "Yellow River" aircraft carrier battle groups left Yulin Port in April, all three aircraft carrier battle groups of the Chinese Navy have been dispatched.

The most important news appeared around 8 pm.

Two land combat brigades stationed in Zhoushan and Qingdao began to assemble, and two amphibious landing fleets have also arrived, indicating that China's military mobilization is accelerating.

However, some people still believe that China is just putting pressure on Vietnam and has no intention of starting a war.

Although this view is optimistic, it ignores a very critical factor, that is, if China wants to put pressure on Vietnam, it will first take action diplomatically rather than military aggregation. If it is first conducted, then China is likely to take action.

Mu Haoyang was not relaxed this night.

At the afternoon meeting, he had been appointed as the commander-in-chief of the front line. This time he did not let him go to the fleet, but asked him to go to Yulin Port.

According to Huang Zhibo's arrangement, the front-line command will be located in Yulin Port.

Before he could even have time to eat dinner, Mu Haoyang boarded a special plane to Yulin Port. The main commanders he mentioned were Yang Yufang, who was responsible for air combat, Zhang Yuting, who was responsible for fleet combat, Zhou Yusheng, who was responsible for sea blockade, and Pang Yuelong, who was responsible for marine combat, had all received orders to rush to Yulin Port from their respective bases, while Ma Mingtao, who was responsible for intelligence, traveled with Mu Haoyang.

This time, Mu Haoyang also had a senior commander around him, namely Zhao Yuanren, who worked at the Volunteer Army Headquarters during the Second Korean War.

More than ten years ago, Zhao Yuanren was just an army major and one of the staff officers under Qi Kaiwei.

Now, he is already a major general in the Army, and one of Qi Kaiwei's most capable subordinates. As expected, Qi Kaiwei will serve as the commander of the Army in two years, and he is likely to be promoted to Lieutenant General of the Army and Chief of Staff to continue to assist Qi Kaiwei.

On the Korean battlefield, Mu Haoyang and Zhao Yuanren did not have a good relationship and did not deal with each other much.

This time, Qi Kaiwei recommended him to command the army's operations. Because he needed an army commander and could not think of a more suitable candidate, Mu Haoyang accepted Qi Kaiwei's suggestions.

Along the way, Zhao Yuanren was a little unrelented.

Mu Haoyang ignored him, because he still had a lot to do.

Establishing a front-line command is a trivial matter, and for Mu Haoyang, he is already familiar with it. The most important thing is that the commanders he cooperated with have their own teams and will be brought to Yulin Port. If these personnel are integrated, the front-line command will come out.

There is only one thing that needs to be dealt with immediately: Determine the overall war plan.

Before this, Mu Haoyang had to figure out the situation, especially Vietnam's military forces. Only by having more knowledge of the enemy can he determine the combat plan.

This is also the reason why Mu Haoyang called Ma Mingtao and asked him to go to Yulin Port together.

The second department provided quite a little information, and it was several meters high. It was impossible for Mu Haoyang to finish reading it within a few hours, so he had to ask Ma Mingtao to help find out the key points.

Fortunately, Ma Mingtao had already prepared.

In April, he received a call from Mu Haoyang, sorting out Vietnam's intelligence and distinguishing it according to its importance so that Mu Haoyang can read and refer to it.

Of course, as an intelligence consultant, Ma Mingtao also needs to memorize all the information in his heart.

Many times, the commander will not go over intelligence documents, but will directly ask the intelligence consultant...
Chapter completed!