.

Vietnam is a very ambitious country and a country that lacks self-knowledge.

In terms of population, Vietnam is the largest country on the Indochina Peninsula, second only to Indonesia in Southeast Asia. By the end of 2029, it had exceeded 110 million. With its superior natural environment, especially the fertile Mekong Delta and Red River Delta, Vietnam could theoretically support 200 million people. However, in other aspects, Vietnam is not a big country at all, and does not even have the capital to be a regional power.

It is undeniable that since the reform and opening up began in the 1990s, Vietnam's economic development has made great progress.

With the development of the economy and the impact of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, China-Vietnam relations have eased for a while, for example, the two sides surveyed the land border. However, on the South China Sea issue, the Sino-Vietnam conflict has not only been eliminated, but has become more acute because of resources, especially oil and gas resources.

In order to confront China in the South China Sea, Vietnam adjusted its foreign strategy at the beginning of the 21st century and began to approach the United States.

At that time, some American scholars claimed that although the United States lost the Vietnam War, it won Vietnam; China helped Vietnam win the war, but it lost the future.

Objectively speaking, this statement is not wrong.

After the Second Korean War, the South China Sea dispute reached a point where it had to be resolved. First, China already has the military strength to win local wars in its surrounding areas, second, China's rapid development requires more resources, and third, China is building a strategic defense circle on the local periphery.

All three factors have made China begin to attach great importance to the South China Sea issue.

Under China's threat, Vietnam has only two choices: one is to take the initiative to concession and return the occupied islands, reefs and sea areas; the other is to find a stronger backer to confront China.

Although in the long run, the first choice is more rational. As a neighbor of China, even if it can be with a big country, Vietnam is not China's opponent. Sooner or later, it will face a strong team directly and be on the verge of a dead end to the confrontation. However, it is almost impossible to make Vietnam take the initiative to hand over vested interests. In 2029, Vietnam mined US$28 billion worth of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea, accounting for 65% of Vietnam's total oil and gas resources, contributing 40% of foreign exchange income that year. Losing oil and gas resources in the South China Sea will lead to a difficult economic situation and national construction will be seriously affected.

The problem is that the cost of confronting China is not low.

In 2029, Vietnam's defense expenditure reached 34 billion US dollars, of which 12 billion US dollars were used to purchase arms from abroad. If the basic defense power was only maintained, Vietnam's military expenditure would not exceed 20 billion US dollars. If relations were improved with China, because neither Laos nor Cambodia had strong military power, Vietnam's defense expenditure could continue to be reduced.

Obviously, Vietnam's resources plundered in the South China Sea are basically used in national defense construction.

As early as 2015, some politicians proposed that Vietnam should revise its basic policies and strive to resolve the South China Sea disputes peacefully as soon as possible, integrate into economies with China as the core, obtain investment from China, and also gain opportunities to enter the Chinese market.

However, this understanding is not accepted by all Vietnamese people, let alone by Vietnamese senior officials.

The huge arms trade not only brought advanced weapons and equipment to the Vietnamese army, but also brought generous benefits to the Vietnamese senior leaders who dominated the arms trade.

According to some Western media forecasts, in the first three decades of the 21st century, Vietnam's senior leaders received at least 10 billion US dollars in kickbacks from the arms trade, and most of them fell into the hands of several major leaders, and this is also the main reason why Vietnam is keen on purchasing advanced weapons and equipment.

The problem is that this pattern will certainly not last.

The reason is very simple. China is gradually raising the threshold for arms race. With the advent of a large number of advanced weapons, Vietnam is increasingly difficult to keep up with China's pace.

It won't take long before Vietnam will lose the arms race.

In the eyes of those knowledgeable people, the day when Vietnam loses the arms race, the war will break out, and China will not give Vietnam a second chance to choose.

By 2027, after the outbreak of the First Indian Ocean War, this sign appeared.

China's military advantage has become very obvious. After Malaysia makes concessions, the pressure on several other countries has increased significantly. Although China has repeatedly emphasized that it advocates resolving disputes through negotiations, everyone knows that this is China preparing for the war.

After negotiations, it must be a war.

Vietnam had to make a choice, and it also made a choice: continue to strengthen its arms.

However, the situation is no longer beneficial to Vietnam.

As China's influence in Southeast Asia increased, it began to win over some countries and formed a political and military alliance group with China as the core. The United States adjusted its Southeast Asian strategy, focusing on taking care of Singapore and the Philippines, and avoiding conflicts with China, and Vietnam's strategic position was greatly reduced.

The most direct manifestation is that the United States rejects Vietnam's "good intention" of renting Cam Ranh Bay.

By this time, it seems that the opportunity to resolve the dispute in the South China Sea has already emerged. As long as Vietnam is willing to make concessions, Brunei and Indonesia will have no choice.

It is precisely due to this that China has stepped up its diplomatic offensive and made its final efforts to peacefully resolve disputes.

According to Du Lei, China has made a package of proposals to Vietnam to resolve the South China Sea dispute. As long as Vietnam is willing to return the occupied islands, reefs and waters, China will provide assistance including trade compensation and economic assistance, and can even help Vietnam achieve military modernization.

Doing so will not be harmful to China, but Vietnam can get enough benefits.

To put it bluntly, as long as the South China Sea dispute is resolved, even if there are still conflicts between China and Vietnam, the risk of military conflict will be greatly reduced. As the economic exchanges between the two countries become closer, as long as there is enough time, when Vietnam cannot live without China in economic terms, it will become an ally of China.

In a sense, this is similar to the relationship between the United States and Mexico.

However, the United States has lowered Vietnam's strategic position but has not given up on Vietnam.

After refusing to lease Cam Ranh Bay, the U.S. Congress approved a military aid bill submitted by the president to provide Vietnam with second-hand equipment at extremely low prices, including forty-eight F-35A fighter jets that were first to serve, thirty-six hydrofoil missile boats obtained from Japan in compensation, 700 M1A3 main battle tanks, 360 M109A7 self-propelled artillery, and twelve air defense systems.

The total value of this batch of arms is over $100 billion, while Vietnam only needs to pay $8 billion in procurement fees and less than $10 billion in training fees.

For Vietnam, this is undoubtedly a pie falling from the sky.

This batch of weapons and equipment can at least double Vietnam's military strength, and is enough to make the Vietnamese authorities misjudgment on the strategic situation.

"According to the information we have obtained, the Vietnamese authorities believe that the military aid provided by the United States is enough to enable Vietnam to maintain sufficient military threats for the next decade, so that we dare not start a war rashly." Du Lei smiled and said, "In the next decade, Vietnam will be able to collect at least $400 billion worth of oil and gas from South China Pirates. As long as half of it is used to purchase arms, the Vietnamese army will maintain its deterrence and force us to continue to resolve disputes through negotiations. Because Vietnam's attitude on the South China Sea issue has changed by 180 degrees. In my experience, even if we continue to put pressure, Vietnam will not be able to make decisive concessions immediately."

"In other words, the negotiations are gone?" Mu Haoyang asked.

Du Lei nodded and said, "Although the negotiations have not yet broken down, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister has expressed his willingness to negotiate and even proposed a higher-level diplomatic meeting, two days ago, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister rejected the package of solutions proposed by me and adhered to his original proposal."

"What's the claim?"

"Divid islands and reefs and sea areas according to the actual controlled area."

Mu Haoyang's brow jumped a few times and said, "Saying this means nothing is talking about."

"It's almost the same. Anyway, the negotiations have been backwards for several years, so we have to face the reality."

"The reality is that we must consider resolving the dispute through ways beyond negotiations." Li Pingko looked at Huang Zhibo and said, "The first batch of arms provided by the United States has arrived in Vietnam, mainly forty-eight fighter jets and twelve missile boats. It is expected that other arms will also arrive within two months. Because the United States and Vietnam signed this military trade contract early last year, the Vietnamese army has already completed the training of the ** staff. The time window for us is only two months. If we cannot make a quick decision, we may be forced to accept the reality."

"What reality?" Huang Zhibo asked.

"Maybe, we have to wait until 2035 to deal with Vietnam."

Huang Zhibo smiled and said, "Military is not a problem. The military aid provided by the United States will help Vietnam reach the international level ten years ago at most. If you really want to fight, Vietnam has no chance of winning and we don't have much burden. The key is whether it is necessary to fight."

Li Pingko nodded thoughtfully and said, "In April, Lao Fu will go to Taipei again."

"There is a result?"

"The Taiwan authorities have stated that as long as the last issue can be resolved reasonably, they will agree to conduct unified negotiations with us."

"National election?"

Li Pingko nodded and said, "Old Fu has agreed to the request of the Taiwan authorities in principle, but the time is not yet ripe, so the unification should be discussed first. Lao Fu's opinion is that we make a promise and write the general election into the political program of peaceful reunification. After the conditions are ripe, the general election will be held. In the current situation, it will take about twenty years. The Taiwan authorities also responded that unification is meaningless before the national election, but agreeing to negotiate first, and the final decision must be made after the general election."

“What final decision?”

“Is it unified?”

"this……"

"Of course, this is not a conclusion, there is a compromise plan, that is, it is carried out in stages. First, it is nominally achieved a high degree of autonomy in Taiwan, such as retaining the power to participate in informal diplomatic activities, and then both sides jointly prepare for the general election for the national election and formally unify it after the general election."

Huang Zhibo nodded and said nothing.

Mu Haoyang also understood that the South China Sea issue must be related to the Taiwan Strait issue. By solving the South China Sea issue, cross-strait reunification can be more effectively promoted...
Chapter completed!