Chapter 51 Fast-paced aerial combat
.The biggest threat to the F-22 is not the warship equipped with long-range air defense missiles, but the equally excellent j-20.
Although the fleet has obtained the ability to detect stealth aircraft after working in grid connections with multiple radars, with its technical level in 2019, the fleet does not have the ability to track stealth aircraft.
The reason is that detection only requires intercepting the target reflected signal, while tracking requires continuously intercepting the signal.
Even if multiple radars are connected to the grid, the air defense warship can only occasionally detect the signals reflected by the f-22, and based on this, roughly calculate the flight route of the f-22, and then guide the air defense fighter to intercept, or pass the information to the early warning aircraft, and the early warning aircraft guides the air defense operations. If you want to use air defense missiles to attack the f-22, you must at least use fire-controlled radar to lock the f-22. Because the air defense combat reaction time of the "Lanzhou" is twelve seconds, and the "Haihongqi 9" takes dozens of seconds to approach the target after launch, so it is necessary to ensure that the target is continuously locked within two minutes, otherwise even if the air defense missile is launched, the missile cannot be directed to the enemy aircraft.
This technical threshold limits the ability of air defense warships in fleet air defense operations.
Not only the Chinese Navy, but also the US Navy, are aware of this problem.
This also explains why modern air defense warships tend to fight against missiles rather than intercept enemy aircraft. Although the huge threat posed by anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles to the fleets have to focus on anti-missile combat, the difficulties encountered in intercepting stealth aircraft also have some influence.
Although the kj-2000 intercepted the signal sent by the f-22 fire control radar and roughly determined the direction of the f-22, without providing more important distance data, the air defense warship could not lock the f-22, and even could not launch air defense missiles to the approximate location where the f-22 was.
What air defense warships can do is to use radar to search for the airspace designated by the early warning aircraft.
No matter what, six air defense destroyers and four multi-purpose frigates with outstanding air defense capabilities will not be sighing.
The result was that in a moment, ten air defense search radars began to work at maximum power.
This is definitely not a good thing for the f-22 that is raiding.
Although the air defense radar on the warship cannot continuously lock the f-22, whenever the radar beam swept over, the radar warning aircraft on the fighter will issue an alarm.
The Japanese pilots on four fighters must be very annoyed.
In order to interfere with the F-22, or to prove the fleet's value in air defense operations, the air defense radars on the ten battleships work in fire control, and each detection area is continuously illuminated for several seconds. A fire control radar specially guided to missiles is also used.
It is strange that the radar alarm aircraft on the F-22 does not ring.
At this time, the situation of f-22 is tantamount to being subjected to high-intensity electromagnetic interference.
Although the radar operating frequency is different, the beams emitted by the warship air defense radar do not interfere with the F-22's fire control radar, the effect of this "beacon fire to play the princes" made Japanese pilots seriously ignore the alarms issued by the radar alarm aircraft.
At that time, the flight speed of four F-22s was sprinting towards the maximum speed of Mach two.
Although theoretically, only one F-22 is needed to launch an attack to shoot down the kj-2000, for the sake of insurance, all four fighters activated the fire control radar and worked in a way that tracked and searched to ensure that when tracking the kj-2000, they continued to detect the airspace ahead.
Anyway, the Japanese pilots knew very well that there must be air defense fighters near the kj-2000.
More importantly, after starting the fire control radar, the f-22 did not detect the fighter jet covering the kj-2000, so it was concluded that the kj-2000 escorted the j-2020, which also has stealth ability. In this way, when attacking the kj-2000, you must be wary of the j-20 that may appear at any time.
Obviously, the Japanese pilot is not a fool.
The problem is that just as j-20 is not easy to detect f-22, f-22 is not easy to detect j-20.
Compared with f-22, j-20's stealth ability is slightly worse, but it is reflected in the omnidirectional stealth ability. In important directions, such as the first half of the ball, j-20's stealth ability is no worse than f-22, and the rs area is also below zero point 01 square meters.
The reason is that the j-20 was designed for air defense operations from the beginning.
In order to develop a fourth-generation heavy air combat fighter with practical combat capabilities as soon as possible, the Chinese Air Force made many choices when developing the J-20, such as adopting the most familiar canard layout and the ammunition bay was designed according to the size of air-to-air ammunition, thus giving up its multi-purpose capability.
Concentrating on improving the stealth ability of the first hemisphere is also a major trade-off made by J-20 in design.
In air combat, fighter jets are fighting head-on, so there is the highest requirement for stealth ability in the front half of the world. Only when performing ground strike missions, especially when it is necessary to break through the enemy's air defense network, can the stealth ability of the side and rear half of the world be strengthened to achieve all-round stealth.
There is another crucial factor that f-22 did not detect j-20 in time.
Although it has the same name, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's F-22 is definitely not the US Air Force's F-22, but has made a lot of simplifications, such as not equipped with an advanced NP-79 fire control radar, but replaced it with an NP-81 fire control radar developed for the F-35.
In fact, this is the result of Japan's struggle.
The first batch of twelve F-22s were equipped with the np-73 fire control radar on the f-18f. Because this radar was already behind, and in the Second Korean War, the U.S. Navy's f-18f made no achievements in air combat and even rarely participated in air combat. Therefore, Japan threatened to develop the fire control radar itself, and finally allowed the United States to make concessions and provide more advanced np-81. After delivering the 60th F-22, the United States also specially provided twelve sets of radars to improve the original twelve f-22s.
Obviously, the numbered number does not represent the performance of the radar.
The f-35 is a typical medium-sized multi-purpose fighter, focusing more on strike capabilities than on air control, so the radar developed for it is far inferior to the np-79 in air-to-air.
In the tracking and scanning mode, the detection range of np-81 is only twelve degrees horizontal and six degrees vertical.
In other words, only the targets of this regional class can be found.
When intercepting invading enemy aircraft, the j-20 will definitely fight directly and will not detour, because the enemy aircraft is approaching at high speed and there is not enough time to detour.
The problem is that kj-2000 is evading, and f-22's fire control radar must follow kj-2000.
As a result, j-20 leaves the detection area of f-22 before entering the effective detection range.
At 5:15, the distance between the f-22 aircraft group and kj-2000 was shortened to 120 kilometers, entering the -120d attack area.
Unfortunately, the time to launch the missile has not yet arrived.
When attacking on the front, the range of -120d exceeds 120 kilometers, and the target can reach 150 kilometers without maneuvering, or even further. However, when chasing the attack, the range will be shortened according to the target's flight speed.
Take the large early warning aircraft with a maximum flight speed of nearly 900 kilometers, the maximum range of -120d during tail-chasing attack is about 20% shorter than that of oncoming attack.
In other words, to ensure that everything is foolproof, the range should be shortened to about 90 kilometers.
In this way, it takes about ninety seconds for the f-22 flying at a speed of two Mach to obtain the ideal fire time.
At this time, the pilot of the captain made a bold decision and almost rewritten the air combat results: let the two F-22s continue to use fire control radar to lock the kj-2000 and open fire when they reach the ideal distance. The other two F-22s changed the working mode of the radar and focused on searching the surrounding airspace.
Obviously, Japanese pilots are also worried about potential j-20s.
Just fifteen seconds later, the two F-22s who were in the search and alert mission detected four J-20s coming from the northwest, and the distance was calculated to be no more than one hundred kilometers.
The Japanese pilot did not hesitate and immediately adjusted the working mode of the radar, locked the four J-20s, and then launched the missiles.
What the Japanese pilots did not expect was that less than ten seconds after the -120d was launched, the four j-20s changed their course and accelerated and flew away.
Obviously, all the eight-120d that just launched were wasted.
The escape speed of j-20 is much faster than that of early warning aircraft, so when the tail chase attack, the maximum range of -120d will not exceed seventy kilometers.
However, the mission of the f-22 is not to shoot down the j-20, but to kill the early warning aircraft.
F-22 did not pursue J-20, and the East China Sea Fleet was in the southwest. It would enter Chinese airspace after fifteen minutes of flying west.
At less than 5:16, the two F-22s who were attacking the KJ-2000 adjusted the fire control radar to lock mode.
When fully operating in lock mode, the locking distance of the fire control radar will increase by 50%, and more accurate target data can be obtained.
Obviously, this is also for the sake of security.
This working mode is only necessary when dealing with highly mobile fighters. It is not necessary to deal with bulky early warning aircraft.
The Japanese pilot's idea is very simple, there is only one chance to raid, so you must not miss it.
At this moment, four F-22 radar alarm aircraft issued an alarm again.
In the first few seconds, the four Japanese pilots ignored it because before that, the radar alarm sounded several times, and each time it was a false alarm.
When the radar alarm plane stopped abruptly and the missile alarm plane rang, the Japanese pilot reacted violently.
This time it is definitely not a false alarm, but a missile approaching!
Subsequently, the comprehensive passive electronic system on the f-22 gave accurate information. The electromagnetic waves intercepted by the radar alarm aircraft came from the northwest direction, not the southwest direction of the fleet, and were the fire-controlled radar of the j-20. However, the four j-20s that illuminated the f-22 were not the four j-20s that turned back, but four j-20s approaching from ultra-low altitudes. Because the distance of the radar detecting low-altitude targets will be greatly shortened, before this, the f-22 did not find these four j-20s.
In desperation, the two F-22s responsible for the attack immediately launched missiles.
Although it only takes a few seconds to launch the -120d, these precious seconds still made the two F-22s miss the opportunity to avoid incoming air-to-air missiles.
The two F-22s responsible for searching and alert did not launch missiles, but immediately maneuvered.
At this time, two Japanese pilots made a fatal mistake.
Because the low-altitude J-20 locked itself, the two pilots believed that the four J-20 launched missiles were selected to climb rather than dive when adopting the evasion tactic, because as long as you climb a few thousand meters, you can exceed the maximum firing height difference of the medium-range air-to-air missile.
Chapter completed!