.If the confrontation between j-11 and f-15j is just foreplay, then the confrontation between f-22 and j-20 is the main show.

This battle is definitely a model of modern air combat and is also the first time that two active fourth-generation heavy air combat fighters face each other head-on.

You should know that with the service time of T-50 being far away, the J-20 is the only fourth-generation heavy air combat fighter that can challenge the F-22. Outside the battlefield, especially after the Second Korean War, countless military fans and military strategists compared the performance of these two fighters, and even simulated the air combat of the two fighters, hoping to use this to judge who is the most advanced fighter.

However, the real king does not exist on paper, but on the battlefield.

More importantly, it is definitely not some advanced fighter jet that determines the outcome of modern air combat, but the intelligence and command system for air combat.

To put it simply, without an air combat command and intelligence system with early warning aircraft as the core, the F-22 and J-20 are just a fighter with superb performance. It is impossible to defeat opponents supported by early warning aircraft in modern air combat, and it is even more impossible to win air supremacy.

In fact, it was the command and intelligence system of both sides that decided to defeat this air battle.

Tactically, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is not bad.

The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, which has been deeply informed by the US military, is very clear that the key to seizing air supremacy is not how many enemy aircraft can be shot down, but whether it can defeat the enemy's command and intelligence system and thus dismantle the enemy's air combat system. Therefore, in terms of tactical arrangements, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force focused on China's early warning aircraft.

According to the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's combat plan, when the F-15j entangles China's air-control fighter jets, the F-22 attacks China's early warning aircraft.

If this tactic takes effect, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force can win the battlefield air supremacy in one fell swoop, at least temporarily.

The problem is that there is a fatal loophole in this tactic, that is, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force lacks means of sea strikes, and it is impossible to attack the East China Sea Fleet immediately after the battlefield erupts. You should know that in the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's combat plan, sea combat has never been considered. To be precise, it has never been considered to engage in the East China Sea Fleet composed of six air defense destroyers and four multi-purpose frigates.

Obviously, it is unrealistic to use f-22 to attack the East China Sea Fleet.

Although the F-22 is also a multi-purpose fighter under the training of the US military, it can carry precisely guided munitions to perform strike missions and its combat efficiency is even greater than that of the F-35, when attacking sea targets, the F-22's bomb bay cannot accommodate heavy anti-ship missiles at all, and can only carry anti-ship missiles through plug-ins. In this way, the F-22's stealth ability will be gone.

Without stealth, the F-22 will not be much better than the third-generation fighter.

Because the f-15j is a standard air defense fighter, even when the third modernization improvement was improved, the ground strike capability was added through the improvement of the fire control system, but it was not as thorough as the f-15, such as the lack of sufficient heavy-load external plug-ins and the lack of necessary sea-to-sea ammunition.

Strictly speaking, the ability to attack the sun.

The problem is that at that time, there were only 12 F-2s deployed at Kadena Air Force Base, and none of them had completed combat readiness, so it was impossible to follow the air-controlling fighter jets.

Even if these twelve F-2s are sent, they may not necessarily threaten the East China Sea Fleet.

This shortcoming directly determines that the tactics adopted by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force are not impeccable.

It can be said that the tactics adopted by the Chinese Navy at that time were precisely aimed at this situation, that is, the main purpose of the East China Sea Fleet was to deal with the f-22 that might come to attack.

During the Second Korean War, the Volunteer Army proved that the F-22 was not undetectable.

After the war, some information released by the United States also proved that the stealth ability of the F-22 was not perfect and could be detected in some cases.

There is nothing strange about this. The f-22 is just that the radar reflects weak signals, not that it does not reflect electromagnetic waves.

Theoretically, f-22 reflects electromagnetic waves to eight main directions, thereby weakening the reflected signals in other directions.

Therefore, as long as there is a radar receiver in these eight directions, the signal reflected by the f-22 can be intercepted.

During the Second Korean War, the volunteer army took advantage of this and detected the F-22 many times and organized effective air defense interception.

However, the technical means at that time were not perfect enough.

The biggest problem is that without sufficient technical force to support the establishment of multi-base address radar, it is impossible to ensure that f-22 can be detected at any time.

After the war, the Chinese team spent a lot of effort to solve this problem.

The most important thing is to solve the synchronization of the radars involved in the detection, that is, let multiple radars work simultaneously, thereby forming a multi-angle detection system.

Not only the Air Force, but also the Army and the Navy are actively involved in this matter.

The reason is very simple. Obtaining means to detect stealth aircraft is related to air combat, as well as national air defense and fleet combat.

Relatively speaking, the Army's problems are best solved.

The remote alert radar deployed on the ground is fixed, and data can be exchanged through a wired network, making it easy to synchronize.

The second is the naval ship.

In any case, the warships have enough space to accommodate more equipment. Moreover, the warships in the fleet operate in a coordinated manner and are close to each other. They can exchange information through high-bandwidth tactical data links to make the radar work synchronously. If the laser directional communication system is successfully developed, the fleet can also obtain anti-stealing target combat capabilities in complex electromagnetic environments, allowing the fleet to obtain more powerful air defense capabilities.

In the East China Sea Fleet, the radars of six air defense destroyers are working simultaneously.

Although the fleet's distribution range is not very wide, especially in air defense operations, the formation is very close, but the air defense destroyers are located outside the fleet, with a distance of between fifteen kilometers and twenty kilometers. A multi-base radar network composed of six air defense destroyers is enough to ensure that the reflected signals of f-22 are detected in a certain direction.

This detection distance is not too far, but it is enough to provide several minutes of early warning time for air control.

For fast-paced air confrontation, a few minutes are enough to decide the victory or defeat.

For the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, the only advantage is its military strength, because only eight J-20s are accompanying the KJ-2000, while the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force dispatched twelve F-22s.

The problem is that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force does not know that the J-20 has been launched into combat.

More importantly, in the first round of battle that just ended, 11 of the twelve f-15js were shot down before counterattacking. Only eight j-11s were found in -767, hovering over Okinawa, and several low detectable targets appeared in the southwest direction of the battlefield.

The result is that the commander of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force believes that the J-20 has participated in the war and is the main force to shoot down the F-15j.

This judgment directly affected the tactics of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

When attacking the KJ-2000, only four F-22s broke out, and eight F-22s remained on the east side of the Diaoyu Islands, preparing to face the J-20.

If you can get close to the kj-2000 quietly, four f-22s will be enough.

In fact, as long as one f-22 approaches kj-2000 and shoots six -120d at a time, you will be almost 100% sure to shoot down kj-2000.

You should know that the sprint speed of the f-22 is Mach 2 and can fly more than 30 kilometers in one minute.

In other words, even if the KJ-2000 discovers the F-22 150 kilometers away, it only takes one minute to avoid it, and the early warning aircraft can fly up to fifteen kilometers in one minute. The fighter aircraft that is accompanied by the early warning aircraft will take at least five minutes to participate in the battle and intercept the approaching F-22. At this time, the F-22 has launched a missile.

Using four F-22s to deal with one KJ-2000 is also considered to be a rival of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

However, the result of this air battle was not as expected by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force commander.

When the kj-2000 was about 250 kilometers away, that is, 150 kilometers away from the East China Sea Fleet, f-22 was exposed.

At that time, the air defense officers on the Lanzhou were not sure what they detected was the f-22.

The reason is very simple. Before the f-15j aircraft group was defeated, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force dispatched the second f-15j squadron. It is still impossible to confirm whether the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force dispatched fighter jets that performed sea attack missions, so it can only be judged that there are several Japanese fighter jets more than 100 kilometers east.

But, this result is enough.

Through the tactical data link, the "Lanzhou" transmits the detected results to kj-2000 in real time, and then distributes them to j-20, which performs the escort mission by the early warning aircraft.

At about 5:11, the air defense combat commander on the kj-2000 determined the nature of the target.

It is f-22, and it is approaching the patrol airspace of kj-2000.

However, these f-22s are definitely not sure about the exact location of the kj-2000.

The reason is that the distance between -767 and kj-2000 exceeds 650 kilometers, exceeding the maximum detection area, so kj-2000 cannot be detected.

However, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force must have other detection methods.

For example, radio monitoring stations deployed on the ground and tactical intelligence provided by strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft such as the US military's -135.

You should know that the passive detection distance between the -135 and the early warning aircraft exceeds 800 kilometers.

However, electronic reconnaissance aircraft can only passively receive electromagnetic waves emitted by early warning aircraft, so it can only roughly determine the active area of ​​the early warning aircraft, and cannot accurately lock the early warning aircraft.

To attack the early warning aircraft, the f-22 must start the fire control radar.

It can be said that this is a very fatal problem.

Although the f-22's fire control radar is very advanced, even if the f-22 purchased by Japan uses low-grade products, the detection distance of large aerial targets such as early warning aircraft is more than 300 kilometers. However, when the whereabouts of the early warning aircraft cannot be clearly known, or even the patrol area of ​​the early warning aircraft, the f-22 cannot accurately grasp the timing of starting the fire control radar, and can only use the fire control radar as soon as possible to expose its whereabouts.

As a result, the Japanese pilot activated the fire control radar at about 2000 kilometers away from KJ-2000.

Now, there is nothing to doubt anymore.

While turning around, the kj-2000 arranged the escort j-20 to intercept, and also called the fleet to provide air defense fire support.

Now, what the four F-22s have to face is not a separate early warning aircraft, but an air defense barrier composed of escort fighter jets and surface fleets.
Chapter completed!