Before the Battle of Solomon, Mu Haoyang had no worries at all.

According to Zhou Yusheng's memories after the war, Mu Haoyang basically approved the combat plan to march into the Solomon Islands with a "fight and see" attitude. To be precise, the naval march plan, which does not include the combat part of the Marine Corps for the time being. After the navy seized the sea control power, it would be decided whether to land in the Solomon Islands. In other words, before the Battle of Solomon, Mu Haoyang was not very sure of winning.

Judging from the situation at that time, the key was to hit, not to hit any results.

From the overall strategic planning perspective, entering the Solomon Islands is actually a cover for the mainland battlefield, that is, attracting the attention of the US military, making the United States hesitate on the issue of sending troops to Russia, and trying to convince the opponent that China is about to launch a strategic offensive in the Pacific.

Of course, the march into the Solomon Islands was just a prelude to a series of battles.

At the end of August and early September 2053, even if Mu Haoyang deployed a million troops on the Pacific battlefield, it would not have much impact, because the Chinese Navy had only two aircraft carriers and it was impossible to launch a large-scale landing campaign, so there was no strategic offensive.

The problem is that this situation will change soon.

At the latest in early November, the Chinese Navy will obtain seven super aircraft carriers and complete the transformation of more than twenty escort aircraft carriers. Even if the Chinese Navy does not win the Battle of Solomon, the US Navy will only have three super aircraft carriers and three large aircraft carriers, and it will take four super aircraft carriers four months to obtain four super aircraft carriers. In other words, within these four months, the Chinese Navy has sufficient strategic advantages.

That's why the navy's march into the Solomon Islands was just a prelude.

The problem is that even Mu Haoyang didn't think clearly about how to fight next, or he didn't expect Gong Jifei and Tong Shaoyun to achieve such a major victory.

Judging from the situation at that time, Mu Haoyang even prepared for his defeat.

Of course, even if you lose, even if you lose two aircraft carriers, the impact will not be great. At least the Chinese Navy occupied Ponape Island and laid the foundation for launching the next round of strategic offensive. Moreover, with the arrival of five super aircraft carriers in November, the Chinese Navy still has an advantage in military strength. The only difference is that if two aircraft carriers were lost in the Battle of Solomon, Mu Haoyang would definitely take charge personally.

More importantly, the next step is to attack the Solomon Islands.

The problem now is that the naval strength has not been substantially reduced, because there are four large comprehensive warships in service in advance, so there are still enough warships to form seven complete aircraft carrier battle groups, and an anti-submarine warship can be added to each battle group.

The question that arises is: attacking the Solomon Islands, or entering the more strategically valuable Hawaiian Islands?

Although the risk of entering the Hawaiian Islands is greater, because the US military's defense deployment in the Hawaiian Islands is more complete, it can also be supported by strategic aviation deployed on the local level, and the distance to the local level is closer. In addition, Hawaii is also a state of the United States, and the US military will definitely try its best to guard the island. However, while the risks are high, the benefits are also greater, such as being able to obtain a forward base to bomb the US mainland. More importantly, seizing the Hawaiian Islands can also affect the United States' military layout in the Southwest Pacific.

You should know that all routes from the west coast of the United States to Australia and New Zealand must pass within 2,000 kilometers of the Hawaiian Islands, so tactical air forces deployed in the Hawaiian Islands can cut off these routes, and there is no need to use submarines. Only by starting from the east coast of the United States, entering the Pacific Ocean through the Panama Canal, and then heading to Australia and New Zealand, the number of routes far away from the Hawaiian Islands is relatively far away from the Hawaiian Islands. The problem is that if the United States transports troops and combat materials from the East Coast to Australia and New Zealand, the length of the route will increase by one third. Moreover, after the Panama Canal is completed in 2033, it can only pass through a maximum of 200,000 tons of ships, and super cargo ships with a capacity of 300,000 tons will have to go through the Strait of Magellan, and these cargo ships are the backbone of shipping.

Of course, it is definitely not difficult to sweep away nearby islands and archipelagos with the Hawaiian Islands as a base.

In a sense, capturing the Hawaiian Islands can lay the foundation for victory for the Pacific War. Before occupying this archipelago, the victory achieved by the Chinese Navy can only be regarded as a tactical victory, not a strategic victory, and is very far from achieving the final victory.

So many benefits have forced Mu Haoyang to reconsider his strategic layout.

Of course, not everyone thinks that it should enter the Hawaii Islands. It can even be said that among the senior generals of the Chinese Navy and Marine Corps, only Mu Haoyang believes it is necessary to enter Hawaii.

The strongest opposition was Zhou Yusheng. In his opinion, without twenty super aircraft carriers, he could not defeat the Hawaiian Islands.

Although Zhou Yusheng's estimate is a bit exaggerated, because later actual combat proved that so many aircraft carriers were not used at all, his analysis also made some sense, because there were more than 2,000 US combat aircraft on the Hawaiian Islands, and they could be supplemented from the local area at any time. More importantly, as the front line was shortened, it was a problem with the US military before, but now it has become a problem with the Chinese navy. Not to mention anything else, how to transport combat troops to the front line and how to ensure that these combat troops receive sufficient support is a big problem.

At that time, even Pang Yuelong opposed the march into the Hawaiian Islands.

Pang Yuelong had only one reason to object: the Marines had limited troops to mobilize, which was not enough to capture the Hawaiian Islands.

In fact, this is the biggest problem.

Although by early November, the Marines' combat troops will be expanded to twenty Marine Divisions, and there are ten Marine Divisions that have completed mobilization. The problem is that the equipment production speed cannot keep up with the expansion speed, and the Marines can only obtain one-quarter of the new ground war platform, and the remaining three-quarters must be provided to the Army. As a result, by early November, at most, only eight Marine Divisions have obtained ground war platforms. Among these eight Marine Divisions, one Marine Division is already in the Horn of Africa, and two Marine Divisions are on standby in Pakistan, and may be sent to the Persian Gulf at any time to control strategic coastal areas. In other words, only five Marine Divisions are left, and one Marine Division has participated in the offensive operation at the end of August. According to Pang Yuelong's estimate, at least ten Marine Divisions are required to attack the Hawaiian Islands.

At that time, this looked a bit exaggerated.

You should know that there were 200,000 officers and soldiers in the ten Marine Divisions. Because the proportion of combat personnel of the Marine Division was higher than that of the Army Group Army, the number of combat personnel was equivalent to five armies. At that time, the total number of US military deployed on the Hawaiian Islands was only 400,000 soldiers, and three-quarters were non-combatants. Among the 100,000 combat personnel, there were only about 36,000, which means that two US Marine Divisions were the main forces.

With the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Marine Corps, only four Marine divisions are required to attack the Hawaiian Islands.

However, the subsequent actual combat proved that Pang Yuelong not only did not overestimate the defense power of the Hawaiian Islands, but also underestimated the combat capabilities of the US military.

In addition, there is another issue that Zhou Yusheng and Pang Yuelong did not mention: logistics support.

You should know that even if you start from Guam, the length of the route to Midway, the westernmost end of Hawaii, is more than the distance from Zhoushan to Port Alaba. If all count from the local area, the length of the logistics supply line for Chinese troops to fight in the Hawaiian Islands is three times that of the US military.

What is this concept?

Even if the number of offensive troops invested as many as the defenders and the combat consumption was equivalent, the logistics support burden of the Chinese army was three times that of the US army.

In fact, the investment of the attacking side must be at least twice that of the defense side, and the combat consumption is generally two to three times that of the defense side. That is to say, in order to ensure the capture of the Hawaiian Islands, the total amount of logistics supplies transported by the Chinese army is between twelve and sixteen times that of the US army.

Obviously, the US military will definitely be able to recognize this problem and will make full use of the Hawaiian Islands.

In Pang Yuelong's words, if it is not done well, the Hawaiian Islands will become the Waterloo of the Chinese Navy and Marine Corps.

In contrast, the Chinese military is seriously insufficient in logistics.

At that time, there were less than 2,000 transport ships directly serving the navy, or had been requisitioned by the navy, and most of them were used in the Indian Ocean, mainly transporting combat supplies to ground troops on the battlefields of the Middle East and Iran. There were less than 200 ships in the Pacific Ocean, and mainly on the local routes to Fusang, Ryukyu Islands and Mariana Islands. The basic needs of garrisons at these three locations could only be maintained.

In fact, what the Marines want is strategic airlift power, because large electric transport aircraft will not be threatened by submarines.

Unfortunately, even by the end of 2054, the Marine Corps did not receive enough air transport support.

With Qi Kaiwei's appetite, it may not be until the second half of 2055, or even early 2056, that the Marine Corps will obtain the strategic airlift strength they want.

At that time, Mu Haoyang also knew about these problems and thought of ways to solve them.

However, his efforts did not achieve results, mainly because Qi Kaiwei was still unwilling to invest troops in the Pacific Ocean, and he did not want to use his precious strategic airlift power on the Pacific battlefield. You should know that in terms of value, strategic airlift power is more meaningful on the mainland battlefield. The reason is very simple. In addition to strategic airlift, railway transportation is mainly used for railway transportation, and the efficiency of railway transportation is far less than that of sea transportation.

Of course, for Huang Hanlin, Mu Haoyang's request was not supported.

Politically speaking, Huang Hanlin will not shift his strategic focus before defeating Russia, or until he loses the hope of quickly fighting Russia.

After recognizing these realistic and cruel problems, Mu Haoyang had to make compromises.

With the attack capabilities of the Chinese Navy and Marine Corps at the end of 2053, attacking the Hawaiian Islands was indeed an absolute strategic adventure. Attacking the Solomon Islands not only has a greater grasp of their ability, but also can achieve the most important strategic purpose, that is, forcing the United States to invest more troops in the Pacific Ocean.
Chapter completed!