Chapter 94: Fighting the Indian Ocean again

On January 4th, a lot of things happened.

First, the Russian President held a rally on Red Square in Moscow, announcing Russia to mobilize war, and called on all Russian soldiers and civilians to take up weapons to fight the invaders. Although the atmosphere at the rally was very hot and the crowds were indignant, the president's call was somewhat less convincing, because Russia invaded Iran first, and China's reason for declaring war on Russia was Russia invading Iran.

Of course, this is not something Mu Haoyang is concerned about.

Judging from the situation at that time, it would be really strange if the Russian president did not stand up.

On that day, Mu Haoyang was most concerned about two things, one was the information that came back from the submarine, and the other was the matter that Zhou Yusheng mentioned.

The matter raised by Zhou Yusheng is related to the biggest problem that the team has: communication.

One of the main reasons why the Chinese Army is invincible on the mainland battlefield is that the command communication is very smooth and the orders can be accurately assigned to troops at all levels.

There is only one reason: the Army has made great efforts in this regard.

At that time, the Army was equipped with a high-altitude long-distance unmanned aircraft, and its main purpose was to act as a transit platform for directional communications.

Interestingly, the project was invested separately by the Army and had little to do with the Navy and Air Force.

When starting this project, the Army also proposed to cooperate with the Navy and Air Force, but it was rejected. The main reason was related to the nature of the military. For example, the scope of activities of the Army combat troops was relatively limited, and the command posts were generally fixed in a certain place, while the Navy and Air Force were relatively mobile. The impact of this was that the directional communication system between the Navy and the Air Force was generally only used at the tactical level. At that time, the Navy and the Air Force also wanted to deal with communication issues, especially long-distance communication, but were all looking for a good solution.

Practical combat has proved that the Army's high-altitude long-distance drone is a very ideal communication transfer platform.

Although this platform is still relatively limited in terms of its scope of function, that is, the maximum communication distance is only one thousand kilometers, it also has a very prominent advantage, that is, the confidentiality is very high. More importantly, the way the army uses on the battlefield, has dealt with the problem of insufficient communication distance, that is, using multiple high-altitude long-distance drones to form a series communication line, extending the communication distance to thousands of kilometers.

Of course, this approach also has many shortcomings.

For example, low communication efficiency can only meet basic communication requirements. For example, excessively long communication transit chains are very easy to be destroyed. As long as one drone has a problem or is shot down by the enemy, the entire communication system will be paralyzed. In addition, the endurance and flight time can only meet the combat needs at the battle level.

The problem is that there is no better way to deal with this, at least not at that time.

After seeing the effectiveness of the army's use, Zhou Yusheng immediately realized that this was a reliable means of naval fleet communication, so he made a suggestion to Mu Haoyang to borrow a few aircraft from the army to see if they can be used as a fleet communication transit platform, and then decide whether they can be purchased separately.

Mu Haoyang did not refuse, but immediately asked Zhou Yusheng to deal with it.

In fact, he has a more indirect understanding of communication issues.

In the Second Battle of Digo Garcia, communication was a big problem, especially when the fleet had to keep radio silent, it was very difficult to communicate with the rear. Most of the time, they could only passively receive messages. If the message was needed, they would encounter big problems. Judging from the process of this naval battle, if the communication problem was handled at that time, Mu Haoyang's pressure on the command link would be greatly reduced.

Of course, this matter was handled quickly.

Because the combat operations on the mainland battlefield were smoother than expected, the Army had several high-altitude long-distance drones that were not useful.

What really needs attention is the information about the submarine coming back.

In the early morning of the fourth day, an attack nuclear submarine hovering in the south of the Solomon Islands, that is, the northern part of the Coral Sea, felt a huge US fleet heading south, and its destination was estimated to be a southeastern port in Australia. Because the distance is too far and the US military's anti-submarine barrier is very tight, this attack nuclear submarine cannot get close to the US fleet, so it is impossible to find out the specific situation of the US fleet.

Only one thing can be confirmed, this is a huge fleet with strict protection.

The telegram clearly mentioned the "fleet", not the fleet, and it also stated that the fleet's voyage was more than thirty knots, and the fastest fleet at that time was only twenty-four knots.

The question is, how big is this fleet?

In fact, as early as after the Second Digo Garcia Naval Battle, Mu Haoyang believed that the US military would send a fleet to the Indian Ocean at an appropriate time. Although Mu Haoyang did not think that the US military would give up the Western Pacific battlefield, nor did he think that the US military would try his best to seize the sea control of the Indian Ocean, he had reason to believe that the US military should at least send a fleet, even if it was just a fleet without aircraft carriers.

The main reason is that the United States must prove to Australia that it still has enough military strength.

By the end of December last year, Mu Haoyang's premonition became stronger and stronger, especially after the "Battle of Dera Holmes", the US military sent fleets to the Indian Ocean and even concentrated its forces to seize the sea control of the Indian Ocean, and it would become larger and larger over time.

The reason is simple: the United States cannot afford the bad consequences of the Middle East defeat.

Strategically speaking, the United States only increases its troops to the Middle East and cannot ensure victory. Only by seizing the Indian Ocean’s sea power can it win in the Middle East.

You know, the United States is mobilizing, and China is mobilizing.

Although the mainland battlefield can effectively restrain the Chinese army, the scale of the Chinese army is originally larger than that of the US Army and has very strong combat effectiveness. More importantly, China's ground warfare platform has long been mass-produced. During the war, the output of each month can be equipped with an army, and similar US equipment will not be mass-produced until at least the second half of 2053. These factors combined determine that the US military will not be able to win the Middle East battlefield without only investing in ground forces.

The Russian invasion of Iran and the war between China and Russia created conditions for the US military to send troops to the Indian Ocean, or in other words, it prompted the US military to send troops to the Indian Ocean as soon as possible.

In Mu Haoyang's view, the US military will make a very wrong judgment at this time.

This is, the Chinese Air Force will be confined to the mainland battlefield and it will be difficult for the naval operations, so the US military has the opportunity to defeat the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean.

On the surface, this is indeed reality.

In the Middle East, mainland battlefield, Iranian battlefield and local defense, the Chinese Air Force needs at least 3,500 tactical fighters and about 400 strategic bombers. This is exactly the entire force of the Chinese Air Force when the war begins, which is equivalent to consuming all the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Air Force.

In reality, this is obviously not the truth.

The reason is very simple. The war has been fighting for more than two months. After the war broke out, just before the National Congress officially launched the war mobilization, Huang Hanlin issued a Yuan order to allow China's military-industrial enterprises to operate in full and military production began to increase rapidly.

Two months is enough to complete the mobilization work of the military industry.

In December 2052, Chengfei and Shenfei delivered a total of 400 fighter jets, equivalent to the production of two years in peacetime.

By January 2053, this number would have to be increased at least twice.

You should know that under the circumstances of full mobilization, problems in peacetime are no longer problems, such as academic property rights, such as production patents.

On January 1, Xifei, Nanfei, Guifei and Hafei all joined the ranks of fighter jet production. A total of ten fighter jet production lines began to operate in full, and the adjustment of supporting industries was completed at the end of December last year, which was enough to provide enough spare parts for aircraft manufacturers.

Of course, the shortage of industrial workers has had a great impact on aircraft output.

If all these ten fighter production lines reach the maximum, China can produce 2,000 fighter jets in one month, with an annual output of up to 24,000.

In addition to fighter jets, the production capacity of bombers has also been greatly improved.

It can be said that by January 2053, the problem of insufficient combat aircraft of the Chinese Air Force had weakened and its combat effectiveness was rapidly increasing.

Of course, it doesn't matter what judgment the US military makes.

Importantly, the US military has no better choice.

You should know that after the main forces were sent to the Middle East battlefield, it was difficult for the US military to launch a strategic offensive in the Western Pacific, so there was no need to continue to stay in the Western Pacific. More importantly, there was enough intelligence to show that the US military's defense deployment in the Mariana Islands had been completed, and two air bases were built in Micronesia to complete the expansion of the base group. The impact of this was that as long as the Chinese fleet was still active in the Indian Ocean, even without the cover of the fleet, they could rest assured.

Of course, this is also reality.

Without fleet support, the ground troops deployed in the Ryukyu Islands and Fusang could only take on defensive tasks and could not attack the Mariana Islands.

With the main conditions and actual needs, there is nothing strange about the US military sending troops to the Indian Ocean.

This is also true. On January 1, Mu Haoyang adjusted the deployment of submarines and strengthened the surveillance of the Western Pacific and the Southwest Pacific.

However, what made Mu Haoyang feel a little unexpected was that the US military was acting very quickly.

If the submarine intelligence is not wrong, the US fleet entering the Coral Sea left Guam on January 1, so the US military made the decision to march into the Indian Ocean at that time. If various factors in the decision-making process were taken into consideration, the US military had already made the decision before January 1.

This made Mu Haoyang realize a problem, that is, the US military's march into the Indian Ocean must have something to do with other battlefields.

As for what the relationship is, Mu Haoyang couldn't figure it out for a while. After all, before January 1, it was unlikely that the US military would know that China would attack Russia.

More importantly, Mu Haoyang was not sure what kind of fleet the US military sent.

Chapter 94: Fighting the Indian Ocean again
Chapter completed!