Chapter 11 Strike weapon

Cruise missile submarines can be said to be a remnant of the nuclear era.

After the Washington Treaty came into effect, the number of strategic nuclear submarines in the United States was limited to twelve. Therefore, in the next decade, the only strategic nuclear submarine project of the US Navy was to replace the "Ohio" class that had been in service for decades with the "Ethan Allen" class.

This class of strategic nuclear submarine is named after its biggest supporter, Ethan Allen, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Navy.

Compared with the Ohio class, the Allen class still retains the basic configuration of twenty-four submarine-launched ballistic missiles to meet the basic requirements of the US Navy. Because the US Navy bears 60% of the weight in the "triune" strategic system, and the total number of strategic nuclear submarines is strictly limited, there are high requirements for the submarine's ability to carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the number of missile warheads. It should be noted that in the same era, China, Russia, Britain, and France's strategic nuclear submarines carried no more than twenty submarine-launched ballistic missiles, generally only sixteen, and the number of warheads carried by missiles is generally lower than the United States.

Of course, this is also related to the nuclear strategies of various countries.

The United States' nuclear strategy is to destroy the enemy completely when the war breaks out, while the nuclear strategy of China, Russia, France and Britain is mainly retaliated, curbing the war ambitions of hostile countries by causing potential hostile countries to suffer unbearable major losses and reaching a limited strategic balance.

After the Convention on the Comprehensive Destruction of Nuclear Weapons came into effect, strategic nuclear submarines became historical products.

However, in this global convention, there is no requirement to demolish strategic nuclear submarines, but only to demolish submarine-launched ballistic missile launch devices on strategic nuclear submarines and destroy all submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. Submarines are missile carriers, not nuclear warheads, so they are not in the ranks of destruction. Countries can decide how to use these nuclear submarines based on actual conditions.

From an economic perspective, it is not cost-effective to directly scrap a strategic nuclear submarine with a cost of 100 million yuan.

At that time, the Chinese Navy considered transforming strategic nuclear submarines into cruise missile submarines and entrusted the Wuhan Shipyard to formulate a transformation plan. However, when it entered the project funding review stage, it was rejected by Teng Yaohui, then Chief of General Staff, and it was not possible to become a fact. Subsequently, the eight strategic nuclear submarines in the Chinese Navy were successively retired, and only two were handed over to the Military Museum and the Navy Museum. The other six were sold to the shipbreaker after dismantling sensitive equipment and nuclear reactors, and were all destroyed before 2040.

Teng Yaohui did this, which makes sense.

At that time, four of the eight strategic nuclear submarines of the Chinese Navy were in service for 20 years, and the average service age of the four 096s was ten years. According to the plan, the 094 will all be replaced by the 098, and the 096 will also be retired after 2050, because the core design life of the 096 is only 25 years, and the maximum service life will be reached around 2050.

In other words, when the Convention on the Comprehensive Destruction of Nuclear Weapons comes into effect, the Chinese Navy's strategic nuclear submarines are being replaced.

According to the Convention, the Chinese Navy stopped the construction of four Type 098 ships and sold the completed hull to the shipbreaking company by 2040.

If the remaining eight strategic nuclear submarines are transformed, the efficiency and cost ratio will not be much higher.

The 094 model is close to its maximum service life. Even if the core of the nuclear reactor is replaced during the transformation, it will be limited by the structural life of the hull, and it will only serve for ten years at most. Because the replacement of the core is huge, and the engineering period is quite long, it will also occupy the construction capacity of the shipyard, so it is very unprofitable. In addition, the basic technology of the 094 model is quite backward. If it is undergoing a comprehensive transformation, the cost will definitely be very amazing. From the perspective of efficiency and cost ratio, it is better to use new technologies to transform the 094 into a cruise missile submarine.

Although the transformation efficiency of the 096 model is slightly better than that, without replacing the core, it can serve for ten to fifteen years after the transformation. If the core is replaced, it can serve for twenty to twenty to twenty-five years, but the 096 model has too little ownership, and there are still similar defects in basic design. You should know that the difference between the 096 and the 094 model is not big. The real main strategic nuclear submarine in the Chinese Navy planning is the later 098 model, and it is planned to replace all strategic nuclear submarines with the 098 model before 2050.

The impact caused by this is that the benefits of transforming the 096 type are not obvious.

In addition, whether to equip cruise missile submarines is also related to the tactical needs of the Chinese Navy.

To a large extent, the Chinese Navy is still a regional navy, mainly operating near the local area. It does not have the global combat capabilities like the US Navy, nor does it have the combat capabilities far away from local or overseas bases, so it does not have much high requirements for long-range strike capabilities.

To put it bluntly, the main combat areas of the Chinese Navy can be supported and covered by shore-based aviation forces.

In this way, the navy is only part of the strike force, and the fleet with aircraft carriers as the core already has enough ability to complete the strike mission.

Obviously, the Chinese Navy does not need to equip cruise missile submarines.

From the perspective of use, rather than spending huge amounts of money to build cruise missile submarines, it is better to spend the same amount of money to purchase bombers and anti-submarine patrol aircraft.

You should know that in terms of strike purposes, the combat efficiency of bombers carrying cruise missiles and anti-submarine patrol aircraft is no less than that of cruise missile submarines. Because communication with submarines is very difficult, and the navigation speed of submarines is far less than that of air platforms, so in terms of combat flexibility, cruise missile submarines have no advantages. In terms of tactical performance, the only advantage of cruise missile submarines is concealment, but the range of cruise missiles generally exceeds one thousand kilometers, and the range of some slower cruise missiles can even reach 3,000 kilometers. The missile carrier platform does not need to approach the target at all, or even enters the war zone, and concealment is not worth much.

In fact, the main value of cruise missile submarines is strategically, that is, to launch a sudden strike on potential enemy countries.

The problem is that when nuclear weapons have become history, the more than 100 cruise missiles carried by cruise missile submarines are simply impossible to destroy a country, and their strategic strike capabilities are not as good as a bomber group or an aircraft carrier battle group, so their existence is not high.

Of course, the situation of the US Navy is different from that of the Chinese Navy.

When the Convention on the Comprehensive Destruction of Nuclear Weapons came into effect, eight Allen-class ships had already been in service, and the other four had completed the construction of ships. More importantly, the average service age of the eight Allen-class ships that have been in service is less than five years, and their hull and core design lifespans are fifty years. In other words, there is no need to undergo a comprehensive transformation at all. It only needs to change the submarine-launched ballistic missile device to cruise missile launch device, and these submarines can serve forty-five years. From the perspective of efficiency and fee ratio, the Allen-class has very potential for transformation.

In terms of tactical use, the US military is also highly dependent on cruise missile submarines.

The reason is very simple, the US Navy's strike capabilities are seriously inconsistent with its mission.

Although the US military has fifteen aircraft carrier battle groups and is still the world's number one naval power, the US Navy's range of activities is four times that of the Chinese Navy, and its military density is much lower than that of China. Moreover, the US Navy is most of the time fighting in the local area of ​​principle.

In this way, the US Navy needs to enhance its firepower delivery capabilities, that is, its strike capabilities.

Compared with expanding the fleet size, transforming twelve brand new strategic nuclear submarines into cruise missile submarines is obviously more cost-effective.

You should know that the delivery capability of the twelve cruise missile submarines in an assault is equivalent to that of an aircraft carrier battle group, but the renovation cost is only one-tenth of that of an aircraft carrier battle group. Even if the cost of purchasing missiles is included, it is only 15% of the aircraft carrier battle group.

In addition, in terms of tactical use, the US military has always pursued a front-line deployment strategy, so the concealment of cruise missile submarines has been put into use. To put it bluntly, the US military can deploy cruise missile submarines to hot spots in advance to make up for the problems caused by the lack of other strike forces. If twelve cruise missile submarines are used in a concentrated manner, it means that in war, the US can obtain the strike capability equivalent to an aircraft carrier battle group if necessary.

That's why the United States not only completed the construction of the latter four "Allen" class, but also completed the transformation of twelve cruise missile submarines before 2045.

In fact, the United States has a lot of experience in this regard.

More than 30 years ago, the US Navy converted four Ohio-classes into cruise missile submarines.

Compared with the Ohio class, the Allen class did not require the ability to deliver special forces during its transformation, so all the twenty-four submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers were transformed into cruise missile launchers. Each unit was equipped with seven cruise missiles and carried 168 of the entire boat. If necessary, twenty-eight can be carried in the torpedo compartment, but this is generally rarely done.

In terms of performance, even in 2052, the "Alan" level was not behind.

Because it is a strategic nuclear submarine, the most prominent thing about the Allen class is its silent performance. When the submarine speed is twelve knots, the noise intensity of the Allen class is less than 92 decibels, which is quieter than that of the same period and even ten years later than that of the same period. In addition, the Allen class's self-sustaining ability is also quite excellent, with a standard patrol period of 90 days. The US military once set a record of 150 days of continuous patrol. Of course, in other aspects, the performance of the Allen class is not very good. For example, the maximum submarine speed is only 28 knots, the maximum diving depth is only 440 meters, the self-defense weapon has only four 533 mm torpedo tubes, and the reserve capacity is only 28.

Judging from the strike ability, the "Alan" class is definitely a weapon in the hands of the US military.

Chapter 11 Strike weapon
Chapter completed!