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On the road to the exhibition of armed helicopters, the Chinese team explored and took many detours.

Due to the power system, before the Second Korean War, the Chinese team did not have real armed helicopters. It was not until 2016 that the first type of armed helicopter was launched. However, by this time, the inclined rotary wing aircraft had begun to gradually replace helicopters, and the Chinese team was also in bsp;   In fact, this was also the international trend at that time.

After the Second Korean War, the United States first realized that armed helicopters were about to die. Due to the limitations of the most basic problems, helicopters are not as good as tilted rotary wing aircraft in terms of flight degree, flight altitude, load, combat radius, etc., while tilted rotary wing aircraft have all the characteristics of helicopters in lift flight mode. Therefore, as relevant technologies mature, replacing helicopters is only a matter of time.

At that time, the United States developed the first tilt rotary wing attack aircraft based on the mv-22.

It is only affected by the inherent reliability problems of mv-22 that this aircraft code-named 22 was not mass-produced, but was dismounted after three years of development and converted to technical reserves.

In 2024, China developed the world's second military tilt rotary wing aircraft and immediately equipped the Army Aviation.

Like the mv-22, this aircraft code-named qy-1 also has the problem of low reliability. Three aircraft crashed due to failure in the first year of equipment, which caused the fleet to be grounded for half a year. The Army eventually purchased more than 100 aircraft without adding a second order.

Not long after, the First Indian Ocean War broke out, followed by the Indochina Peninsula War.

In both wars, armed helicopters came in handy.

Especially in the Indochina Peninsula War, the Chinese Army's bsp;    On the contrary, the attack aircraft, which has always been underestimated, performed very well in this war.

At that time, the Air Force and the Navy had a group of J-22 and J-25 fighter jets specifically carried out attack missions, providing strong support to the Army's ground forces. For example, in a battle to attack the sea defense, the Air Force's J-22 rushed over less than three minutes after the ground forces issued a support request and defeated the Vietnamese counterattack troops with intensive bombing. In the battle in Guangping Province, the Navy's J-25 was the "guardian saint" of the ground forces, almost on call, and the bombs dropped eliminated more than 80% of the enemy troops.

The performance of the attack aircraft in this war left a profound impression on the Army.

Because of the conflict of interest with the Air Force, the Army focused on the tilted rotary wing aircraft. However, due to factors such as reliability, the Army's offensive tilted rotary wing aircraft project did not progress smoothly, and it was not possible to make a major breakthrough before the outbreak of the war against Japan.

Affected by the war against Japan, the Air Force did not attach much importance to professional low-altitude attack aircraft.

The mission of the Navy Air Force is more clear and there is no investment in the attack aircraft project.

It was not until the outbreak of the war against Japan that after the military expenditure soared, the Air Force launched the low-altitude attack aircraft project. The main reason was to compete with the Army, that is, to use this project to restrict the Army's offensive tilt rotary wing aircraft project and strive to obtain more project funds.

However, the subsequent global natural disasters have caused all arms projects to be affected.

Even if everything goes well, the Air Force's low-altitude attack aircraft project will not be completed until around 2043. It would be great to be able to equip the troops in 2045.

It can be clear that the Chinese side has determined the general direction, namely, to launch a special low-altitude attack aircraft.

It can be said that this is not a simple decision, because it means abandoning the armed helicopter and the offensive tilt rotary wing aircraft, and the Army Air Force will be transformed into a combat force with limited support capabilities and mainly based on short-range vertical projection, that is, enhancing the Army's vertical maneuverability.

It is not a question worth arguing whether it is wise to give up the armed helicopter.

Although many people have raised objections, for example, Guizhou Aircraft Manufacturing Group proposed that in future wars, armed helicopters will still be useful, and fighter jets do not have an advantage in dealing with low-altitude helicopters. Armed helicopters are the main force to seize "treetop air supremacy", but in the era of technology being developed, the low-altitude maneuverability advantages of helicopters have no room for development, and the faster-flying low-altitude attack aircraft can perform ground support tasks more effectively.

In fact, the low-altitude attack aircraft mentioned here has a very strong smell of attack aircraft.

From the perspective of tactical use, especially close-range support to the enemy, low-altitude attack aircraft can completely replace armed helicopters and can complete tasks more efficiently. Whether in local armed conflicts or large-scale wars, the combat efficiency of low-altitude attack aircraft is much higher than that of armed helicopters. For example, during the Indochina Peninsula, when fighting aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy perform close-range support tasks, the combat efficiency is six times that of armed helicopters. Only in some special circumstances can armed helicopters be useful, and inclined rotary wing aircraft that have obtained attack capabilities through improvements and other means can perform armed helicopter tasks for most of the time.

Of course, this is not just the choice of the Chinese team.

By around 2030, in addition to Russia's improvement of the Ka series and Mi series armed helicopters, and Europe launched the "Tiger 2" armed helicopter, neither China nor the United States had new armed helicopter projects, but had only developed light reconnaissance helicopters.

However, the armed helicopter did not immediately withdraw from the war stage.

By improving hardware, upgrading software, etc., a large number of armed helicopters serving in the early 21st century still have sufficient combat capabilities. For example, the AH-64 is equipped with more than a dozen countries and regions, and its latest improved models have used stealth technology.

On some more special battlefields, armed helicopters still have a place to use.

The Golan Heights are a relatively special battlefield.

During the battle in the Sinai Peninsula, the Israel Defense Force did not use armed helicopters. It was not that it was impossible to use it, but that the Israeli Air Force failed to seize air supremacy. Over the empty desert, armed helicopters were very vulnerable to fighter attacks and basically had no power to fight back. For example, on the morning of the 22nd, an J-22m of the Egyptian Air Force discovered an Israeli AH-64d after completing a patrol mission, and then shot it down with a rocket-boosted guided bomb, killing two pilots, while the Egyptian fighter was completely damaged.

More importantly, the threat is not just from high altitudes.

In open areas, what armed helicopters need to worry about the most is the mobile field air defense system. For example, within three days after the 24th day, Israel lost nearly twenty helicopters, of which six reconnaissance helicopters were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, and two large transport helicopters were shot down by portable air defense missiles. There is no essential difference between armed helicopters and these helicopters, and they are easily shot down by air defense fire after entering the war zone.

In addition, other issues need to be considered.

Helicopters are very low in combat in desert areas. Although the Israeli army has taken many measures to prevent sand and dust, in the battle before the 28th, at least seven helicopters were lost due to failures, three of which encountered sandstorms while performing their missions and crashed due to motive failures.

In the direction of the Golan Heights, the climate has much less impact.

More importantly, the terrain of the Golan Heights is very complex, which facilitates helicopters to conduct low-altitude hidden maneuvers, and is not easily seen by fighter jets flying at high altitudes. It can also use terrain to cover and launch surprise attacks on armored troops, and can effectively avoid the enemy's field air defense system.

Affected by these factors, the Israeli army's armed helicopters did not play much role in the battlefield of the Sinai Peninsula, but were concentratedly deployed at the local northern air force base.

It can be said that these 100 Ah-64ds are the most important anti-armor force in Major General Baram's hands.

However, before the battle begins, no one knows how much role these armed helicopters can play.

On October 1, when the Syrian Army was actively preparing to attack, Major General Baram took the initiative to attack again and launched a counterattack operation code-named "Sword of Revenge".

This time, the protagonist is not the military armored forces, but the air strike force mainly composed of armed helicopters.

According to the information released after the war, Mossad had obtained exact information at that time. The Chinese Army General Qi Kaiwei, who commanded the Egyptian army to turn defeat and win on the battlefield on the Sinai Peninsula, had arrived in Damascus and became the supreme commander of the Syrian army as a full-power military adviser.

This piece of information must have had an impact on Balam.

In his memoir, Baram mentioned that the most admired Chinese man is Huang Zhibo, so there is reason to believe that he will definitely not underestimate Qi Kaiwei.

The result was that Baram did not expect to defeat the Syrian army again through ground assaults.

Judging from the situation at that time, if the Israeli army launched a large-scale ground assault again, even if it could severely damage the Syrian army, it would suffer heavy losses. Because there were not enough reserves and even the most basic logistics support was difficult to guarantee, it was unlikely that Baram would take risks again.

In this way, air strikes become the only option.

On the night of October 1 alone, nearly 300 armed helicopters of the Israeli army dispatched, and most of them carried out three combat missions.

The purpose of the attack was clear: paralyze the armored forces of the Syrian army and delay the offensive operation as much as possible.

The Israeli army's counterattack was very fierce, and the Syrian army's resistance was also very tenacious.

With the lessons learned from the past, the Syrian army strengthened its defensive deployment, and all the armored troops entering the front line were scattered and did not go to the offensive position.

More importantly, Syria also has an armed helicopter unit that cannot be underestimated.
Chapter completed!