.

When Mu Haoyang arrived, Huang Zhibo was whispering to Li Pingko.

After he had made coffee, Li Mingyang rushed over. Mu Haoyang didn't say much and soaked a cup of coffee for Li Mingyang. Because Huang Zhibo doesn't drink coffee normally, there is no coffee maker in his office, only a bottle of instant coffee to entertain guests.

As Mu Haoyang knows, Li Mingyang rarely drinks tea and drinks at least five cups of coffee a day.

Perhaps, this is a common problem for intelligence personnel.

"Xiao Li, it won't be a trivial matter if you ask me to invite the Prime Minister, right?"

Li Mingyang smiled at Huang Zhibo and said, "Don't worry, Mr. Huang, your phone will never be called in vain, and the Prime Minister will not be in vain."

Mu Haoyang walked over and placed the coffee cup in front of Li Mingyang.

"This is the information I received in the morning. I have contacted the intelligence personnel to confirm that there is no problem with the source of the information." Li Mingyang handed over the documents he brought to Huang Zhibo. According to the rules of the Second Department, important information must be made of paper files, and there will be no electronic files, and there will be no copies.

Huang Zhibo opened the file and browsed it quickly, and his eyebrows immediately locked together.

Seeing Huang Zhibo's expression, Li Pingko and Mu Haoyang immediately realized that Li Mingyang did not speak loudly, which must be very important information.

After reading it again, Huang Zhibo handed over the information text to Li Pingko.

Li Mingyang did not rush to speak, but took the opportunity to light a cigarette.

"It seems that there is never any mistake to plan ahead." Huang Zhibo breathed a sigh of relief and picked up a cigarette.

This time, Mu Haoyang was even more surprised, because Huang Zhibo had quit smoking for several years and would definitely not have relapsed without something particularly important.

Li Pingko reads documents very quickly, which is common for him.

However, this time he spent half an hour and carefully read the three-page document after Huang Zhibo had already smoked two cigarettes.

"Minister Li, are you sure there is no problem with the source of the information?"

"I can't tell you the specific channels, or according to confidentiality regulations, I can't tell anyone, but I can use the identity of the Minister of the Second Ministry as a guarantee."

Li Pingko nodded, expressed his understanding, and then handed over the closed document to Mu Haoyang.

After browsing only one page, Mu Haoyang knew why Huang Zhibo smoked.

There is only one piece of intelligence: Japan is about to start construction of its first nuclear submarine, and it is likely to be a strategic nuclear submarine carrying submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Strictly speaking, Japan has long owned a "nuclear submarine", namely AIP submarines that use small nuclear devices.

The original meaning of "AIP" is "not dependent on aerodynamic systems", so nuclear submarines also belong to AIP submarines, and are the best AIP submarines. However, in reality, AIP system belongs to the category of conventional submarines. When developing AIP systems, it was first proposed by a Canadian company to develop a small nuclear power system, which mainly charges the batteries on the submarines, rather than as propulsion power. At that time, this concept was highly valued by the United States, but after comparing, the US Navy still chose nuclear submarines.

Influenced by political factors, Germany, France and Sweden did not choose small nuclear power devices when developing AIP technology.

To put it simply, if a small nuclear power device is used, it will be a nuclear submarine in nature.

It was not until after the East China Sea War that, when it was determined to break the "three principles of nuclear-freeness", Japan once again proposed to replace other AIP systems with a small nuclear power system. Subsequently, Japan invested huge amounts of money in this field and developed a small nuclear power device for 4,000-ton conventional submarines.

Japan is actually making technical reserves for the development of large ship-purpose nuclear reactors.

In the Japanese Navy, all the eight latest "Chunchao"-class submarines in service use small nuclear power devices. Unlike nuclear submarines, the power of the small nuclear power device is only five megawatts, or 5,000 kW, which is not enough to drive the submarine to a submarine of more than twenty knots. Therefore, the "Chunchao" class is still equipped with three sets of batteries, and the battery directly drives the motor to drive the propulsion system, while the small nuclear power device only charges the battery. In this way, the "Chunchao" class can only charge the other set of batteries if it reduces the submarine speed to less than sixteen knots, that is, only two sets of batteries can be used. If it sails at a full speed of twenty knots, three sets of batteries are required. The submarine distance at the highest speed will not exceed one hundred nautical miles, which is no different from conventional submarines in performance.

Unlike other conventional AIP submarines, the "Chuntide" class has unlimited submarine capabilities.

In other words, when the operation is believed to be carried out, there will be no photoelectric energy used at the "Spring Tide" level.

In terms of performance, the "Chunchao" class is obviously not as good as the attack nuclear submarine, but it has been greatly improved compared to other AIP conventional submarines.

Japan did this, firstly, because military nuclear reactor technology was not accumulated enough and could not directly develop high-power nuclear reactors. Secondly, it was to test China politically, paving the way for the next construction of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and even nuclear submarines, and also preparing for the development of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of strategic strike forces.

When the construction of the "Chunchao" started, China issued a strong protest.

At that time, China even issued a war threat. However, Japan then launched the construction of the "Flying Dragon" class aircraft carrier, diverting China's attention.

After completing the design of the "Flying Dragon" class aircraft carrier, Japan has gained sufficient technical accumulation in the field of military high-power nuclear reactors.

In other words, as long as Japan wants, it can build attack nuclear submarines at any time.

As for Japan's submarine technology, there is nothing to doubt. On a global scale, there are no more than eight countries that are capable of designing and building submarines by themselves, and Japan is one of them. Before this, Japan has built nearly 100 conventional submarines and has long mastered the core technology of submarines.

For Japan, the greatest significance of nuclear submarines is not to enhance the navy's tactical combat capabilities, but to strategic threat capabilities.

To put it bluntly, what Japan needs most is not attack nuclear submarines, but strategic nuclear submarines.

As for the submarine-launched ballistic missiles on strategic nuclear submarines, there are no insurmountable technical obstacles for Japan.

You should know that Japan is the fourth country to launch artificial satellites, and it is the first country to fully adopt solid-fuel rockets in the commercial field. From the perspective of commercial economic benefits, solid-fuel rockets are far inferior to liquid-fuel rockets. Otherwise, the United States, Russia, Europe and China will not mainly use liquid-fuel rockets in the commercial field. Japan's focus on developing solid-fuel rockets is clearly a technical reserve for ballistic missiles.

It is precisely because Li Mingyang made a judgment that Japan would first build a strategic nuclear submarine.

Although in the analysis, Li Mingyang also clearly mentioned that Japan is likely to not equip the strategic nuclear submarine with submarine-launched ballistic missiles at the beginning, but instead adopt the most direct method, that is, let the strategic nuclear submarine float to the surface and then launch the ballistic missiles to avoid the largest technical barrier of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and to allow the strategic nuclear submarine to have practical combat capabilities as soon as possible, but even so, this is a big threat.

The reason is very simple: deploying ballistic missiles on submarines is equivalent to treating the entire Pacific Ocean as a battlefield.

With Japan's rocket and missile technology, a solid-fuel ballistic missile with a launch weight of less than 50 tons and a range of more than 8,000 kilometers and can be deployed on submarines is basically not challenging, and it does not even require a test launch, so that the reliability of the missile can reach 80%, which is the lowest military standard. In this way, all Japan needs to solve is the missile launch platform, that is, a strategic nuclear submarine.

To this end, Li Mingyang mentioned another possibility in his analysis.

If Japan really needs to obtain strategic deterrence capabilities as soon as possible and has made breakthroughs in nuclear weapons technology, it is very likely to bypass the biggest difficulties. On the basis of the "Spring Tide" level, add a small nuclear power device and a ballistic missile cabin to build a strategic nuclear submarine that can meet basic combat needs. Before China responds, join the club of nuclear powers.

If this is true, Japan's threat will be imminent.

You should know that if you really want to do this, Japan can build strategic nuclear submarines within two years, or use the existing "Chunchao" class submarines to transform several strategic nuclear submarines that are sufficient for use within one year, and Japan will definitely have the ability to build nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles within one year.

The key is not whether Japan has the ability to do it, but whether it has a political foundation for doing so.

To put it bluntly, Japan's construction of strategic nuclear submarines will completely destroy the strategic alliance between the United States and Japan. The reason is very simple. The basis of the alliance between Japan and the United States is that the United States provides Japan with a strategic umbrella. If Japan has its own strategic umbrella, it naturally does not need the protection of the United States, so there is no reason to maintain an alliance with the United States. The United States will not accept a country with independent strategic capabilities as an ally.

In this way, Japan only has one key factor left to build strategic nuclear submarines: speed.

The US-Japan strategic alliance cannot break overnight, and the United States will not immediately turn against Japan. Therefore, as long as the Japanese authorities believe that they can build strategic nuclear submarines and obtain strategic retaliation capabilities before breaking with the United States, they are likely to take risks.

It is precisely because Li Mingyang made the inference that Japan would improve the "Spring Tide" class into a strategic nuclear submarine.

In fact, this is likely to be the main reason why Japan built the "Spring Tide" class and clearly required the adoption of a modular sub-cabin structure during the design stage. Because in this way, Japan can secretly build missile cabin sections and then complete the renovation work within a few months.

By the time China and the United States reacted, Japan had already crossed the threshold of a nuclear power.

As a soldier, Mu Haoyang knew very well how much impact this would have or how harmful it would be.

As a politician, Li Pingko knew better what kind of outcome would be. In his opinion, this was even the main reason why the Japanese Prime Minister did not give him face.
Chapter completed!