.Because there are no independent ballistic missile soldiers, the ballistic missile forces belong to the Air Force in the Pakistani army.

For the Pakistan Air Force, the most ideal strategic deterrence method is not a bomber or a heavy fighter, but a ballistic missile.

Before the Second Korean War, Pakistan's missile technology mainly came from North Korea.

To be precise, it is a tactical ballistic missile built by North Korea obtained from Iran.

Although China also provided some help before Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, China no longer provided missile technology to Pakistan after that. According to reliable information, only after the September 11 incident, that is, after the United States launched the Afghan War, China and Pakistan had a brief missile technical cooperation, and exchanged several US-made cruise missiles landed in Pakistan with the solid rocket engines required by Pakistan. A few years later, China developed several cruise missiles with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers, and Pakistan also "developed" cruise missiles with a appearance very similar to the "Tomahawk" and a range of about 700 kilometers.

During the negotiations the next day, Musharraf personally invited Lu Wen to participate.

No matter how the general treats women, he cannot deny that Lu Wen is China's best missile expert and specializes in rocket engines.

As for Lu Wen’s other identity, it is obviously more important.

Whether China provides ballistic missile technology to Pakistan depends on whether key technologies are involved, and Lu Wen’s job is to conduct technical evaluations.

To put it simply, first of all, Lu Wen has to nod and agree, so that Pakistan can obtain China's missile technology.

Of all the key factors, whether it causes technical leaks is the most important.

Although in many aspects, China's missile technology is not the most advanced. For example, as early as the 1980s, the "Gnome" intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the United States reached a very high technical level. Until thirty years later, China could not produce similar ballistic missiles, and the US Navy's "Trident 2" submarine-launched ballistic missile is a new peak in ballistic missile technology. Even compared with Russia, the gap is very obvious. For example, Russia's SS-27 has been in service for more than ten years, while similar missiles in China are still under development. However, technology is confidential, not only because of advanced technology, but also because other countries can take this opportunity to master China's strategic strike capabilities. For example, when warhead penetration falls into the hands of enemy countries, China's strategic ballistic missile strike capabilities will be greatly reduced. Even some technologies that seem less important, such as rocket engines, will pose a threat to the missile's combat and survival.

With the close relationship between the two countries, China still has not provided missile technology to Pakistan, mainly because there is a risk of technological leakage.

You should know that before the United States withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, it had a very close relationship with Pakistan.

Although Pakistan's defense policy has always focused on China, for a long time, Pakistan pursued multilateral diplomacy.

To put it simply, it means meeting fate and striving to maximize profits.

This policy was maintained until the end of the Second Korean War.

Because of the defeat on the Korean Peninsula, the United States began to fully adjust its strategic deployment and strengthen its investment in South Asia. India became the first choice ally of the United States. US-Pakistan relations cooled down sharply, especially after the United States agreed to sell f-22i and f-35i to India, the United States and Pakistan completely broke up. Therefore, Pakistan quickly revised its defense policy and no longer used the United States to restrict China, nor did it regard the United States as an object to rely on.

The most direct evidence is that Pakistan is preparing to eliminate F-16c/d fighter jets that have been equipped for less than ten years.

Logically speaking, this batch of fighter jets will have to be in service until at least about 2040. Even if Pakistan purchases FC-30, it should be used to replace older fighter jets. Eliminating F-16c/d is to avoid being controlled by others in politics and technology, and to establish good relations with China.

No one can deny that arms sales are linked to politics.

Now, Pakistan has proposed to obtain ballistic missile technology from China and is even willing to purchase a batch of tactical ballistic missiles, which has made Mu Haoyang very embarrassed and Huang Zhibo very embarrassed.

On October 6, Mu Haoyang arrived in Islamabad on the fourth day.

After Huang Zhibo's approval, Mu Haoyang made a clear reply that China is willing to provide ballistic missile technology and sell a batch of tactical ballistic missiles with a range of 450 kilometers. However, all missile troops equipped with Chinese ballistic missiles and using Chinese missile technology must have Chinese technical experts, and the core technology is mastered by Chinese technical experts. The Pakistan Air Force is just a user.

There is no doubt that this is a very strict restriction.

To put it bluntly, as long as China wants to, these missile forces can be paralyzed at any time.

Musharraf obviously could not accept such a proposal, but Mu Haoyang also proposed a supplementary agreement, that is, after Pakistan opens up missile technology, China can provide technical advice and help Pakistan improve missile technology by sending technicians.

Because it is based on Pakistan's existing missile technology, Pakistan has complete intellectual property rights.

That is to say, Pakistan can freely utilize improved missile technology.

On this basis, Musharraf accepted Mu Haoyang's proposal and then made a clear request: the Pakistan Air Force will purchase the DF11m type tactical ballistic missile.

Now, the problem arises.

Although the DF11 ballistic missile is not advanced, its predecessor was the world-famous "Scud" C-type, and its technical source is likely to be related to Iran. Cia has long claimed that the "Scud" C-type missile originally obtained by China came from Iran and was obtained through technical transactions. However, the early models of the DF11m and DF11 are very different. Except for the shared mobile launch platform, the other aspects are completely different.

Even measured by the standards of the 21st century, the df11m can be regarded as a very advanced tactical ballistic missile.

When using a 750-kilogram warhead, the maximum range of df11m reaches 800 kilometers. Only when using a 1,000-kilogram warhead, the maximum range is reduced to within 500 kilometers. If a satellite guidance system is used, the compass error is less than 15 meters. Even if full-range inertial guidance is used, the compass error is only 50 meters. Because warhead separation technology is used, the terminal penetration speed of df11m is close to Mach 20, exceeding the maximum interception range of any existing tactics and theater anti-missile system.

In the Chinese army, df11m undertakes the most important battle assault mission.

Interestingly, China's Second Artillery only purchased four sets of DF11m. First, this new ballistic missile is too expensive, second, it can upgrade and transform existing systems, and third, China is adjusting its military structure. The result is that DF11m is more of a symbolic force.

Musharraf proposed to buy DF11m, which was precisely because of the reputation of this missile.

According to Musharraf's proposal, Pakistan will purchase DF11m equipped with two independent missile brigades, that is, 18 to 24 sets. According to the calculation that each set is equipped with three missile launchers and six missiles, a total of fifty-four to seventy-two missile launchers and one hundred and eight to one hundred and forty-four missiles are required.

Obviously, this is not a small deal.

The key is not how much the Pakistan Air Force has to spend, but how strategic it has.

Although due to international treaties, China can only sell short-range ballistic missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometers, so the DF11m obtained by the Pakistan Air Force will definitely change, but for Pakistan, the maximum range of 500 kilometers is enough to hit New Delhi.

Hundreds of missiles, even with conventional warheads, are a significant threat to New Delhi.

If these missiles are used to strike high-value strategic targets, Pakistan can quickly destroy important strategic targets near New Delhi after the war begins.

With strong enough offensive measures, will Pakistan still be timid on the South Asia issue?

The problem is that the words have been expressed, and they will definitely not be able to be collected.

On October 8, Mu Haoyang and Musharraf signed the first intention agreement, that is, China sold 18 DF11m missile systems to Pakistan and provided relevant technical assistance, while Pakistan guaranteed to use these tactical ballistic missiles under China's supervision.

The last part of the agreement clearly stipulates that both parties strictly keep this transaction confidential.

Before the delivery of DF11m, China will help Pakistan improve missile technology and make appropriate improvements to the DF11m launch vehicle and missile. Then Pakistan will install DF11m in the name of homemade tactical ballistic missiles and launch a domestic missile program.

This is done to avoid overstimulating India.

Musharraf did not object to this.

The reason is very simple. If the DF11m is claimed to be from China, then these missiles can only be equipped with conventional warheads and must be subject to international regulation under the restrictions of the Washington Disarmament Treaty.

Only on homemade ballistic missiles can nuclear warheads be equipped to become a real strategic deterrent.

It is undeniable that this is a strategic arms sales agreement.

You should know that in the past 30 years, China has not provided any country with ballistic missiles with strategic strike capabilities.

Even the other four nuclear powers have never sold similar missile weapons.

China's first breaks the convention, which will inevitably lead to unimaginable consequences.

Not to mention, after Pakistan's missile strength has increased, India will definitely seek to obtain missile weapons with comparable performance through various means. Because India and Pakistan both regard ballistic missiles as the main force of strategic deterrence, the missile competition between the two countries will inevitably lead to a more fierce arms race.

China is willing to sell ballistic missiles to Pakistan, which is also hoping to restrain India through Pakistan.

From another perspective, if China refuses to lend a helping hand, Pakistan will soon lose the arms race and China will face India directly. Only by strengthening Pakistan's military power can we avoid direct confrontation with India and reduce China's arms burden.
Chapter completed!