.On the morning of the 29th, after the Mig-31 flew to Okinawa for the first time, Teng Yaohui discovered an abnormality, that is, all the F-2s stationed in Kadena Air Force Base were placed in the hangar. The air-controlling fighters that should have been given priority care were parked in the open air, and some fighters were also transferred to nearby field airports.booom

To this end, Teng Yaohui also specifically asked the intelligence staff, that is, whether the intelligence provided by the Second Department was reliable.

Because there was no tactical reconnaissance aircraft deployed before this, Teng Yaohui only obtained intelligence from the second unit. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force sent four squadrons of F-2s to Okinawa, plus a squadron that had been deployed in Okinawa, which was equivalent to sending all F-2s to Kadena Air Force Base.

The second part of the answer was very affirmative, all the F-2s that were previously deployed in Japan were flying away.

Obviously, these fighters are only able to go to Kadena Air Force Base.

However, Japan has strengthened its security and protection work for Kadena Air Base. The intelligence personnel lurking in Okinawa cannot even get close to the air base, so it is impossible to determine whether these fighters have arrived or whether they are conspiracy made by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

When the situation is not clear, Teng Yaohui can only think about the bad side.

In fact, judging from the situation at that time, the biggest threat that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force could pose was to concentrate its forces to launch an air strike against the East China Sea Fleet.

In addition, other threats can be ignored.

In the afternoon, Teng Yaohui believed in his previous judgment more.

This time, the key role was not the information provided by the tactical reconnaissance aircraft, but the discovery of early warning aircraft operating above the fleet.

At about four o'clock in the afternoon, a US 35th appeared over the Miyako Islands.

Obviously, this plane is not for the fun.

If the US military intends to watch the fun, it should also dispatch e-3c or e-2d instead of using strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft that only have passive detection capabilities.

Obviously, the US military is secretly assisting Japan to collect tactical intelligence for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

This is not over yet, and then the tactical reconnaissance plane of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force rushed over.

There is no doubt that Japan's tactical reconnaissance aircraft used the information provided by the US strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft, otherwise it would be impossible to know where the East China Sea Fleet was operating.

The interception operation was not difficult, but before the RF-4g was shot down, the radio monitoring equipment on the warship intercepted the communication signals sent by the reconnaissance aircraft.

Now, Teng Yaohui concluded that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force would launch an air strike and would arrive soon.

He doesn't have to worry about the fleet's air defense operations, but Yang Yufang and others are responsible. All he has to do is to judge the tactical intentions of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force as soon as possible and strive to achieve a favorable situation before the war.

At that time, Teng Yaohui made two major decisions.

One of them is to take proactive actions to disrupt the preparations of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force and prevent the enemy from making full use of the advantages of active attacks.

The first one to be dispatched was the Navy Aviation Army.

According to Teng Yaohui's deployment, the Navy Air Force will launch an attack to raid Japan's early warning aircraft before obtaining exact information that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is about to launch an attack.

From the perspective of tactical decision-making, Teng Yaohui is not wrong.

If the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force wants to attack the East China Sea Fleet, in addition to requiring enough F-2s, it also has to seize local air supremacy. Therefore, the early warning aircraft has an irreplaceable role. If Japan's early warning aircraft can be eliminated first, even if the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force cannot be prevented from launching an attack, it can greatly reduce the threat.

To put it bluntly, without the support of early warning aircraft, it is difficult for escort fighters to seize air supremacy.

As long as the air supremacy is still in the hands of the Chinese Air Force, it can intercept invading attack aircraft groups in time.

Because the Air Force had to prepare for the upcoming air defense operations, Teng Yaohui handed over this mission to HNA, and also hoped that HNA could make great contributions in combat.

No matter what, Teng Yaohui is a lieutenant general of the army, so he will naturally arrange key tasks to the naval aviation.

This time, the Navy Air Force still used j and j-10c and did not ask for help from the Air Force. Because the performance of j-20 is not comprehensive enough and the number is very limited, even if the Air Force participates in the operation, it will most likely dispatch j and j-10, and will not use j-20.hub.

However, HNA did not execute the command immediately.

In addition to the unreliable intelligence, Teng Yaohui arranged combat operations temporarily, so it took time to formulate combat plans and complete pre-war preparations.

The key is preparation.

It is obviously not an easy task to assault the early warning aircraft that is wandering around Okinawa.

J and j-10c are not mig-31s, so it is impossible to suppress the opponent with altitude and speed. Because Japanese early warning aircraft have been moving in the cover area of ​​the ground air defense system, Japan's air defense missiles have to be considered during assault, making combat operations more difficult.

The solution is not without it, but it is very direct, that is, using electromagnetic weapons in assaults.

Although the Second Division has obtained information and the United States has sold 60 sets of electromagnetic confrontation systems to Japan, these confrontation systems are used on fighter jets and are not provided to early warning aircraft.

This information is very reliable, at least Japan's e-767 has no electromagnetic resistance.

The reason is very simple. The e-767 uses Boeing's 767 passenger plane as a platform, which is not exactly the same as the US military's e-3c, and cannot use the electromagnetic confrontation system developed by the US military for the e-3c. Although with the strength of the United States, it is not difficult to develop an electromagnetic confrontation system that can be used on the e-767, it is definitely impossible to make it happen if you are anxious.

Perhaps, Japan's e-2d already has electromagnetic resistance, but the 767 definitely does not.

The command and intelligence system of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is key 767, not 2D.

In harsh electromagnetic environments, e-2d is an undesirable early warning aircraft, and at most it can only provide very limited battlefield information for combat aircraft, and cannot guide combat aircraft to combat.

The reason is very simple, e-2d is too small.

With its own command and guidance system alone, the e-2d can command up to four fighter jets, while the e-767 can command twenty-four fighter jets at the same time. If the battlefield information provided by the e-2d is to be used, either receive the assistance of the e-767 or pass through the ground command center. The problem is that in a harsh electromagnetic environment, communication is a problem, and after two command information is transferred, it may not be so flexible.

However, using electromagnetic weapons also requires appropriate tactics.

Because the e-767 is active near Okinawa, ballistic missiles carrying electromagnetic warheads cannot be used, and air-to-air missiles carrying electromagnetic warheads can only be launched by fighters.

In this way, fighter jets must first break through the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's peripheral air defense network.

This is definitely not an easy task for j and j-10c. After all, the enemy still has dozens of f-22a, and there are more f-15j.

In airspace near Okinawa, the intelligence and information advantage is obviously in the hands of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

No matter how far the kj-2000 is, it must remain within the cover range of the East China Sea Fleet regional air defense missiles. The distance from Okinawa must be more than 400 kilometers.

At this distance, kj-2000 cannot detect f-22a at all, and can only barely find f-15j.

Letting the fighter jets go deep alone is obviously no different from sending death.

Fortunately, the team did not lack experience in fighting in adversity, and accumulated a lot of experience in electromagnetic warfare in the Second Korean War.

If you cannot use conventional tactics to make breakthroughs, you can only do it.

It's very simple to say, it is to use electromagnetic weapons to open the circuit and open up an electromagnetic channel wide enough on the assault line of the fighter.

In any case, HNA's j and j-10c have electromagnetic resistance.

Although the radar, communication systems and other electronic equipment on the fighter cannot work normally after being hit by electromagnetic strikes, it will not crash and can participate in combat air combat. In the same situation, even if Japan's air defense fighter can take off the air combat, it will at most engage in combat air combat.

When the fight reaches the stage of fighting air combat, the decision of the outcome is no longer the right to control information, but who invests more fighter jets.

Under normal circumstances, there are definitely no more air defense fighters than attacking fighters.

Generally speaking, there are only four J-20s covering the KJ-2000, and at most only eight, while the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force uses the F-22a to cover the E-767.

When using j to fight f-22a, as long as you have a two-to-one advantage in military strength, the problem is not very big.

Concentrating superior forces on local battlefields is not a big problem for HNA.

In order to ensure that everything is foolproof, HNA has invested 60 fighter jets, including 24 j and 36 j-10c.

According to the electromagnetic warfare tactics summarized by the Chinese Air Force after the Second Korean War, each fighter only carries four pl for fighting. J-10c also needs to carry a large secondary fuel tank on the center mount of the belly to ensure that there is enough fuel to return. The remaining hanging points are all carried air-to-air missiles installed with electromagnetic warheads, or large rockets equipped with inertial guidance systems.

In this way, j can carry twelve electromagnetic rockets, and j-10c can also carry eight with composite hangers.

If the aircraft group conducts assaults in units of squadrons, the twelve js are enough to open an electromagnetic suppression corridor that is 40 kilometers wide and 560 kilometers deep. Even the j-10c squadron can open an electromagnetic suppression corridor that is 40 kilometers wide and 400 kilometers deep.

This depth is enough to ensure that the aircraft fleet completes the assault operation.

Of course, this does not mean that all problems are solved.

After using electromagnetic weapons, the Chinese Air Force's early warning aircraft will also be disturbed, especially in the direction of the electromagnetic warhead detonation, making it difficult to detect Japanese aircraft.

In order to provide guidance information to the assault aircraft group, at least the assault fighter jets must be brought close to the Japanese early warning aircraft, HNA also used two improved strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft to specifically collect electromagnetic signals sent by the e-767. Although the information provided by the strategic electronic reconnaissance aircraft is not accurate enough, it is enough to point the direction for the fighter jets and let fighter pilots know in which direction the Japanese early warning aircraft are evading.

At less than 8 o'clock in the evening, HNA completed the assault preparations.

At this time, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is also preparing for the third tactical reconnaissance of the East China Sea Fleet in order to provide accurate tactical intelligence for the fleet that launched the assault at night.

Because the reconnaissance planes were dispatched separately, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force made a move first.
Chapter completed!