.There is definitely a need to be beaten, but how to fight has become a problem.:

After the cabinet meeting, Kojiro Kimura and Taro Arakawa had a debate on how to fight. Taro Arakawa continued to insist on air combat, that is, before seizing air supremacy, the fleet had to stay outside the battlefield. Kojiro Kimura believed that the fleet could provide strong support for fighter jets that seize air supremacy, so it should enter the battlefield to perform combat missions and counterattack the Diaoyu Islands during the seizing air supremacy.

Strictly speaking, Kojiro Kimura makes more sense.

The first round of war has proved the value of the fleet. If the East China Sea Fleet had not come forward, the ** Air Force's early warning aircraft would not have penetrated into the East China Sea to provide support for air control fighters. On the contrary, it is precisely because the guard group stays in the rear that the ** Air Self-Defense Force's e-767 had to stay in the rear and could not provide support for fighters, which led to the fighter's complete defeat in the battle for air supremacy.

However, there is a very huge loophole in Kojiro Kimura's tactics, that is, it is difficult for the forward guards to obtain effective anti-submarine cover.

Previous battles have proved that the most powerful thing in the Navy is not the surface fleet, but the submarine.

If the underwater threat cannot be resolved, the guards entering the East China Sea will be easily hunted by submarines and have no chance of survival.

Now, the problem returns to the origin.

The most effective combat platform for dealing with submarines is not an anti-submarine warship, but an anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Moreover, the ** has more than 100 anti-submarine patrol aircraft, which is more than enough to cover the entire East China Sea. The problem is that if the anti-submarine patrol aircraft are useful, the first thing to do is to seize air supremacy.

Without air supremacy, anti-submarine patrol aircraft will not be able to enter the battlefield at all.

The result is that air supremacy must be seized first and the anti-submarine patrol aircraft should be used to clear the field before it is the turn of the guard group to participate in the war.

With Arakawa Taro insisting, Kojiro Kimura had to make concessions.

In fact, Kojiro Kimura played a beautiful trick, that is, he used Arakawa Taro to insist on his own opinions and pushed the blame to the Air Self-Defense Force.

According to the agreement reached between the two, Taro Arakawa has three days to seize air supremacy.

Three days later, the fleet commanded by Kojiro Kimura will enter the East China Sea. If the Air Self-Defense Force fails to seize air supremacy, it will first face the ** East China Sea Fleet and assist the Air Self-Defense Force to seize air supremacy, and then counterattack the Diaoyu Islands. If the Air Supremacy has been seized, the fleet will directly counterattack the Diaoyu Islands.

After the agreement, Taro Arakawa launched the combat plan of the Air Self-Defense Force.

Taro Arakawa is also very clear that the key to seizing air supremacy is to destroy the opponent's command and intelligence system, so the focus must be on attacking the sea.

As long as the East China Sea Fleet can be defeated, the Air Self-Defense Force can seize air supremacy.

Affected by this, the Air Self-Defense Force's combat plan revolves around sea strikes and only needs to seize local air supremacy when attacking the East China Sea Fleet.

To this end, the Air Self-Defense Force must first send the F-2 used to perform strike missions to Kadena Air Force Base.

At 10:00 a.m. on May 29, the first F-2 squadron set off from Kyushu Island to Kadena Air Force Base. In the following twelve hours, three F-2 squadrons arrived one after another, increasing the F-2 deployed at the front to sixty, which was also the entire capital of the Air Self-Defense Force.

However, in this way, the efficiency of Kadena Air Force Base is greatly reduced.

Under normal circumstances, the Kadena Air Force Base can accommodate up to 120 fighter jets. If early warning aircraft, tankers, and anti-submarine patrol aircraft are deployed, the number must be reduced accordingly. Only in this case can the utilization efficiency of the Kadena Air Force Base reach the highest, increasing the deployment volume will inevitably reduce the utilization efficiency.

The problem is that throughout the Okinawa Islands, Kadena Air Force Base is the only one who can provide comprehensive logistics support.

Although some minor combat aircraft can be transferred to field airports, these aircraft still have to return to Kadena Air Force Base when performing combat missions.

At that time, the **Air Self-Defense Force only transferred some anti-submarine patrol aircraft.

Anyway, these anti-submarine patrol aircraft are useless before seizing air supremacy.

In addition, the **Air Self-Defense Force has also transferred some support aircraft to its homeland, such as transferring e-767 and k-767 to the air base in Kagoshima, and all -17 and -130j are transferred to the air base in Shikoku Island, trying to leave room for combat aircraft.

In this way, except for the eight e-2ds deployed at Kadena Air Force Base, all of them were fighter jets.

After the additional dispatch of forty-eight F-2s, the **Air Self-Defense Force also deployed 32 F-22a, 72 F-15j, and 12 RF-4g in Kadena, with a total deployment volume of 184, which is close to the maximum deployment volume of 200 allowed by the air force base.

In addition to the problems in deployment, there are also problems in tactical use.

To put it simply, it does not mean that there are so many fighter jets deployed at an air force base, and how many fighter jets can be deployed at one time.

Although after decades of hard work by the US military, Kadena has become the largest air base in the Western Pacific and the most complete infrastructure, at the highest intensity, it can only dispatch 72 fighter jets at a time, and scores in three batches to be launched.

This momentum is obviously not enough to support a high-intensity sea strike.

Based on the dispatch of sixty F-2s, when confronting the ** Air Force, the ** Air Self-Defense Force must provide at least one-third of the attack aircraft fleet. According to the dispatch of twenty-four escort fighters, fighters alone must use 84. In addition, four to six early warning aircraft need to be dispatched to support combat aircraft. Before attacking, twelve reconnaissance aircraft must be used. In this way, more than one hundred combat aircraft need to be dispatched, which far exceeds the support capabilities of Kadena Air Base.

Fortunately, the East China Sea is not an open enough battlefield.

Even if it expands to the edge of airspace between ** and **, the longitudinal depth of the battlefield is within 800 kilometers, within the combat radius of most fighter jets.

This battlefield feature gives the ** Air Self-Defense Force room room for maneuver.

According to the deployment of the **Air Self-Defense Force, only four E-2Ds will take off from Kadena Air Base, and the E-767 will take off directly from Kagoshima Airport. The four K-767s will also take off from Kagoshima Airport to provide support for the twelve F-22a and twelve F-15j that perform escort missions. The twelve fighter jets will be converted to perform air defense missions after completing the escort mission and will not return to Kadena Air Base immediately. After completing the escort mission, the RF-4g performing forward reconnaissance missions will directly return to the local air base.

In this way, even if there is no one fighter plane lost, there are only seventy-two fighter planes that need to return to Kadena Air Force Base immediately.

In addition, because the attack distance is less than 500 kilometers and the combat radius of the fighter is only more than 300 kilometers, after completing the combat mission, the F-2 still has enough remaining fuel. If necessary, it can fly to the adjacent field airport, replenish fuel before returning to Kadena Air Force Base.

In this way, after ensuring that four fighter jets are thrown, the Air Self-Defense Force can also dispatch at least two squadrons of air defense fighters to cope with the Air Force's counterattack, or provide cover for early warning aircraft that are forward to perform command tasks, ensuring that the safety of the early warning aircraft is guaranteed throughout the entire battle process.

After deploying air forces, Taro Arakawa began to consider the safety of Kadena Air Force Base.

It can be said that if ** wants to win in this war, the most direct way is to attack Kadena Air Force Base, causing ** to lose its combat basis.

It is conceivable that if Kadena Air Force Base was paralyzed, the ** would not even have the ability to defend, let alone compete with the ** for air superiority and sea superiority in the East China Sea.

From a technical point of view, ** has enough ability to paralyze the Kadena Air Force Base and does not even need to be used as a combat aircraft.

You should know that ** has the largest tactical ballistic missile force in the world, and there are at least 1,000 tactical ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers, and there are more than 2,000 cruise missiles. As long as ** uses these missiles, the Kadena Air Base will suffer a catastrophe.

Tactical point of view, fifty ballistic missiles equipped with anti-runway cohort warheads are enough.

In contrast, ** does not have a reliable anti-missile interception system, or anti-missile forces that are sufficient to compete with **'s powerful tactical ballistic missile forces.

Although after the Second Korean War, the government strengthened its investment in anti-missile forces and paid more attention to ballistic missiles, especially those tactical ballistic missiles with precise guidance capabilities, and spent huge amounts of money to introduce the theater anti-missile interception system from the government, if the government is still unable to cope with the tactical ballistic missiles, no matter how much investment is, it cannot buy safety.

In fact, after the Second Korean War, the ** also increased its attention to tactical ballistic missiles.

Although ** has its own system of ballistic missile technology and has the ability to develop advanced tactical ballistic missiles independently, after the end of the Second Korean War, it took advantage of the opportunity of China-Russia deepening military cooperation and obtained some advanced technologies, including the guidance components of Russia's "Iskander" missile system.

All of these technologies are used in new tactical ballistic missiles and are also used to improve existing tactical ballistic missiles.

All Taro Arakawa can do is to transfer two taad theater anti-missile systems and four "Patriot 3" tactical anti-missile systems from the rear.

This anti-missile force is obviously just a decoration.

If you really want to attack the military base, even if you concentrate all your anti-missile forces, it may not be possible to ensure that the Kadena Air Base is safe and sound.

More importantly, if ** attacks Okinawa, there is no reason not to attack Turkish military bases.

In other words, when strengthening Okinawa's anti-missile force, ** must also consider local anti-missiles and deploy anti-missile interception systems near important military bases such as Yokosuka, Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Wu.

In a sense, the greatest security guarantee for Kadena Air Force Base is politically.

To put it simply, this is just a local conflict. If ** takes the initiative and has obvious military advantages, there is no reason to attack **'s military base.

The question is, if the battlefield situation reverses, will ** still be so restrained?
Chapter completed!