. In the early morning of the 18th, after receiving the battle report from the 54th Army, Huang Zhibo finally breathed a sigh of relief.

Being late is better than not.

Although the 54th Army did not complete the combat mission within the scheduled time, it finally captured Xinxi and immediately advanced south after annihilated the 7th Infantry Division of the US Army. It is expected that it will reach Pingshan before noon, and the few retreating American troops did not have time to gain a foothold in Pingshan.

Of course, this does not mean that you have won.

Huang Zhibo didn't even have breakfast. He took advantage of the gaps in the electromagnetic warfare and personally called the commander of the 54th Army, asking the 54th Army to continue its efforts to win Pingshan before dark, and then turn to defense to block the coalition forces that broke south.

But the problem is also prominent.

Although the 54th Army fought tenaciously and performed very well, not like the troops who were on the battlefield at all, by this time, the 50th Army suffered a huge casualties, with a reduction of about 40%. Some companies that continued to fight on the front line even had less than 40% of the officers and soldiers. At that time, the biggest problem was that the shortage of troops was not the shortage of troops, but the inability to deliver combat materials to the front line in time.

When reporting to Huang Zhibo, the commander of the 54th Army even mentioned that some infantry companies had to collect enemy weapons and equipment on the battlefield and fight with enemy guns. If even rifles and ammunition could not be delivered, even if the 54th Army could capture Pyongyang, it would not be able to stop the surging coalition forces.

Real difficulties will definitely not be solved by will.

Objectively speaking, the 54th Army fought well enough. As the first force to dispatch, the 54th Army undertakes the most assault tasks and completes the most tasks.

Huang Zhibo did not put too much pressure on the 54th Army, and immediately stated that he would send a division from the 16th Army to Pingshan and be directly commanded by the 54th Army. However, this division was still in Yangde, so he could only arrive as soon as possible on the morning of the 19th.

What the 54th Army had to do was to conquer Pingshan on the night of the 18th.

When making this arrangement, Huang Zhibo began to consider when to use the reserve team.

After three days, the assault mission in the early stage of the Second Battle was basically completed. Although the 39th Army still failed to capture Shitanli as planned, the situation of the coalition forces was even worse, or not as powerful as Huang Zhibo imagined. In the following battle, the main purpose of the coalition forces was to let the Third Infantry Division and the Fourth Infantry Division break south, so the 2nd Infantry Brigade would definitely defend Shitanli to the death, while the 4th Infantry Division would definitely attack the defense line of the 47th Army, and the 3rd Infantry Division would persist on the front line until friendly forces opened a breakthrough.

There is no doubt that the focus is on the defense line of the 47th Army.

Huang Zhibo did not put too much pressure on the 39th Army. The battle approaching Shitan was not that simple. The 39th Army had already done its best.

In this way, it became the top priority for the 47th Army to defend the defense line.

In fact, by this time, only the Third Infantry Division and the Fourth Infantry Division were still fighting in an established system. Half of the Second Infantry Division had been wiped out, while the Seventh Infantry Division was defeated. To achieve the purpose of the second battle, it had to concentrate its forces against the Third Infantry Division and the Fourth Infantry Division.

After thinking it through, Huang Zhibo used the second reserve team, namely the 13th Army transferred from the Chengdu Military Region.

At that time, an infantry division of the 13th Army was in Yangde, not far from the 47th Infantry Division. According to Huang Zhibo's order, the division set out on the morning of the 18th and was expected to reach the eastern suburbs of Pyongyang in the evening. However, Huang Zhibo did not ask the division to strengthen the defense line of the 47th Army, but arranged a new task for them: to attack Pyongyang.

This decision was difficult for staff such as Qi Kaiwei to understand.

The 47th Army had already controlled the highway north of Pyongyang before the Fourth Infantry Division, so the focus of blocking the Fourth Infantry Division was on the defense line in the suburbs.

What is the point of attacking Pyongyang?

Obviously, Huang Zhibo's views are completely different from those of the staff.

If the Fourth Infantry Division wants to break through, in addition to relying on its own strength, it also needs to seek help from other troops, such as the South Korean army stationed in Pyongyang.

Tactically speaking, if you want to succeed in breaking through, you must rely on reinforcements.

It is conceivable that the coalition forces will definitely mobilize the South Korean army in Pyongyang and attack the defense line of the 47th Army from behind.

The problem is here. The 47th Army temporarily built a defense line, and there are only more than 20 kilometers from Pingcheng to Pyongyang, and it cannot withstand the impact on both sides. Although the South Korean army's combat effectiveness is not very good, having enough troops is enough to pose a threat to the 47th Army.

When arranging defenses, in order to deal with the Korean army, the 47th Army dispatched at least half of its troops.

The infantry division of the 13th Army Group attacked Pyongyang, which just solved this problem.

Although the combat effectiveness of the infantry division of the 13th Army is not very good, and is not suitable for attacking and is more useful in positional defense wars, the key to fighting the Korean army is not how much armored power it has, but how great its momentum it has, or the determination shown in the attack.

Through the first battle, Huang Zhibo has realized that the Korean army will only fight with the wind.

If the battle situation is unfavorable, the combat effectiveness of the South Korean army will plummet.

For example, in Dingping, the Korean army successively used six brigades and one division, with nearly 40,000 troops, and took several days to fail to break through the position guarded by only one airborne division.

A similar situation occurred during the battle between the Sixty-Fifth Army on Gaocheng.

When the Korean army was smooth sailing, the Korean army fought very bravely, but as long as the battle was unfavorable, the Korean army often collapsed faster than the volunteer army commanders expected.

Obviously, the Korean army on the Western Front battlefield was not much better.

It can be said that Huang Zhibo's judgment is very accurate.

Although there are as many as 140,000 South Korean troops stationed in Pyongyang, and as the coalition forces shrink their defense lines, the US military will play the leading role in the Western Front battlefield. After the first battle, in order to stabilize the Eastern Front, the coalition sent several elite troops of the South Korean army over.

In other words, almost all those who stayed on the Western Front were the reserve troops of the South Korean army.

If you show your momentum, it would not be a strange thing to use a division to defeat Pyongyang.

Of course, Huang Zhibo did not expect to use a division to conquer Pyongyang. His purpose was very simple: to restrain Pyongyang's South Korean army with active and proactive attacks and reduce the pressure on the 47th Army.

In addition, after the Thirteenth Army joined the war, the Forty-Seventh Army was able to use more troops on the northern defense line.

However, this deployment is very bold.

You should know that if the 47th Army failed to withstand the Fourth Infantry Division and failed to contain the Pyongyang defenders, the two main divisions of the US military could break through from Pyongyang. To the south of Pyongyang, the 39th Army might not be able to quickly capture Shitanli. The US military could head south all the way to Pingshan, reach Pingshan within two days or even one day, concentrate its forces to attack the 54th Army, and then break through from Pingshan.

There is no need to doubt Huang Zhibo's courage. If he can take the courage of four US military advisors in one breath, he will definitely not lack courage.

The problem is that Huang Zhibo is unwilling to take too much risk when it comes to the success or failure of the battle, so after sending an additional division to the 47th Army, Huang Zhibo focused on the frontal battlefield. The best way to prevent the US military from breaking through is not passive defense, but to restrain the US military's breakthrough speed, forcing the US military to use more troops elsewhere, such as dealing with the Volunteer Army's offensive forces.

The problem is that by this time Huang Zhibo had only two infantry divisions in his hands.

You know, the 13th Army and the 16th Army have only two divisions.

What can two teachers do?

If it is used on the front battlefield, that is, to assist the 24th Army, it may be of no use.

After two days of fighting, the defense line of the Third Infantry Division was still solid, and the 24th Army still failed to make an effective breakthrough after paying a huge price. It can be said that the greatest contribution of the 24th Army was only forcing the Third Infantry Division to concentrate its forces to defend the defense line.

In the face of the US military's complete defense system, the military strength cannot solve the problem.

Strengthening frontal offense is of no help, so you can only find ways to go on the flanks.

According to Huang Zhibo's arrangement, the two infantry divisions went south from Tokugawa and Monsan respectively, and then launched an assault on the rear guards of the Fourth Infantry Division.

Although there are only two infantry divisions and their assault capabilities are very limited, Huang Zhibo's order is very clear, that is, the assault operation must be firm and decisive, and not entangled with small groups of US troops. The ultimate goal of the assault is to arrive in Pyongyang and meet with the 47th Army, so as to force the Fourth Infantry Division to launch on the rear front.

For the breakout troops, it is definitely a disaster to deploy troops on the rear front.

Let’s not talk about whether the Volunteer Army’s assault can annihilate the Fourth Infantry Division. As long as it is forced to launch in the rear, the Fourth Infantry Division will lose the primary factor in breaking out: time.

When logistics support has been cut off, delaying for an extra hour means that the hope of breaking through is reduced by one point.

More importantly, this not only concerns the survival of the Fourth Infantry Division, but also the survival of the Third Infantry Division.

If the Fourth Infantry Division fails to break through the defense line of the 47th Army in time and open up the road from Pyongyang to Kaesong, then the Third Infantry Division will definitely use up all ammunition before the Volunteer Army.

Without combat supplies, it would be great if the US military could surrender to the volunteers decently, let alone break through.

You know, just last month, the First Land Warrior Division surrendered to the Volunteer Army as a whole because it was hopeless to break through.

After making this arrangement, Huang Zhibo almost used up all the reserve team.

At that time, the only ones that could be mobilized was the 44th Airborne Division, which had not participated in the battle after entering North Korea. As a pure infantry unit, the Airborne Division's assault ability on the ground battlefield was not even as good as that of infantry, and had almost no ability to participate in the battle behind, and at most helped the front line troops to guard the logistics supply line.
Chapter completed!