The thunderous counterattack of the Volunteer Army not only made Allen lose his black hat, but also forced the United States into a corner.

Before Huang Zhibo returned to Beijing, Lindbergh hurriedly signed an order to remove the position of commander-in-chief of the coalition forces, and Lieutenant General Du Lieutenant of the coalition forces was temporarily replaced by Allen.

It only takes one document to remove the position of commander-in-chief of the coalition forces, and it is not so easy to turn the situation around.

A few days ago, no one would believe that the Volunteer Army could completely overturn the entire Eastern Front battlefield in just a few days and annihilate two US Marine Divisions in one fell swoop.

No one can deny the facts, let alone change the facts.

The question before the US authorities is: Is it necessary to continue fighting?

Within a few hours, Lindberg held three consecutive meetings at the White House.

Although it was not the soldiers who dominated the major national strategies of the United States, but civilian officials, Lindberg attached more importance to the opinions of soldiers on the issue of war.

After receiving the news that Allen gave up the First Marine Division, Lindberg held a meeting of the Joint Conference.

As an admiral, Chandler also attended the meeting.

Although the First Marine Division has not surrendered yet, and some generals also believe that the First Marine Division will not surrender, no one doubts the end of the First Marine Division. With no hope of retreat and even greater hope of breaking through, the First Marine Division will definitely be destroyed, and it won't take long.

Military terms, the coalition forces were completely defeated on the Eastern Front battlefield.

The question is, is there still hope on the Western Front battlefield?

Chandler gave a very affirmative reply: With the 24th Army about to enter North Korea, it is difficult for the coalition forces to make a decisive breakthrough on the Western Front battlefield.

With this conclusion, other problems will be much easier to solve.

When the Eastern Front is completely defeated, it is impossible for the coalition forces to protect themselves, or to protect the results they have achieved. When the volunteers adjust, they will definitely launch an attack again, and the main purpose will be to recover Pyongyang.

The question is here, can the coalition forces defend Pyongyang?

Although most of the U.S. generals who attended the meeting believed that with four army divisions and South Korea was about to conduct a third-stage war mobilization, the coalition had the opportunity to defend Pyongyang, when Lindberg asked them to make a statement, no general was sure of this conclusion.

In other words, the US military generals have no inevitable confidence.

In Chandler's words, even if the coalition forces can curb the Volunteer's second offensive, it will not allow the Volunteer Army to give up the offensive. As long as Pyongyang is still in the hands of the coalition, the Volunteer Army will not put down its weapons and the war will continue, and the coalition forces cannot always ensure that they defend Pyongyang.

The key is that the United States cannot bear too much casualties in war.

Now, the problem is in hand with Lindberg.

As the commander-in-chief of the US military, Lindberg must make a decision whether to hold armistice negotiations with China when the situation is still favorable to the coalition forces, or to continue fighting and strive for better results.

For Lindberg, this was undoubtedly a big bet.

However, the risks and benefits of this gamble are difficult to be proportional to.

If the bet is won, the coalition forces will win at most the second battle, curb the offensive momentum of the Volunteers, but cannot completely disintegrate the fighting will of the Volunteers, and will only force the Volunteers to launch a larger third battle. If China's determination to war is taken into account, it may even force China to invest more troops and enhance the offensive capabilities of the Volunteers. For the United States, this means that it will bear greater casualties before the war is over.

If the bet is lost, the coalition forces will not only lose Pyongyang, but also likely to lose the entire Western Front battlefield. Just like the situation on the Eastern Front, the coalition forces will definitely not be able to gain a foothold after the battle is defeated, and even have to retreat all the way to Kaesong. Because the terrain in western North Korea is relatively flat, there is not much danger, and there is a relatively complete railway and highway system, after the retreat begins, it is very likely to evolve into a retreat.

It is obviously not for Lindberg to bet all the bets, or the fate of the United States, on a battle.

As a politician, Lindberg knew very well that he should never have too much hope.

The greater the hope, the greater the disappointment.

After the military meeting, Lindberg convened a meeting of cabinet members.

As Director of CIA, Chandler is naturally qualified to attend the conference.

In contrast to the optimism of the generals, civilian officials were not very optimistic. Among them, Chinese Secretary of State Strauss was the most unique and proposed to negotiate a ceasefire with China from the beginning.

In the eyes of many cabinet officials, the United States has lost, or is not far from failure.

If you continue to fight, you will only add to casualties and you will not get any substantial benefits at all.

Interestingly, cabinet officials were more active on the issue of whether to fight the second battle, and even Strauss believed that it was necessary to defeat the spirit of the volunteers on the battlefield.

This attitude of officials is very directly reflecting the conflicting choices faced by the United States.

Negotiations in the event of losing are obviously not good for the United States, and it is very likely that the United States will lose even worse at the negotiating table. Only after winning the battle, at least curbing the volunteers on the battlefield, can the United States reach a more ideal armistice agreement with China at the negotiating table.

The question is whether to fight or not, or whether it can fight, is not determined by the will of the cabinet officials.

The United States faces many difficulties in the issue of whether to fight or not.

The most prominent thing is the huge financial pressure.

Although it only took two months to fight, the US federal government has paid $450 billion in special war expenses for the war, and in the next six months, it will also take out $1200 billion to purchase weapons and equipment for the army, purchase ammunition and drug supplies, and pay pensions for casualties.

All of this money has to be paid out by the federal government.

For the already stretched US federal finance, paying $165 billion in war expenses is definitely a worse situation.

Although before that, the US federal government had reached an agreement with the Federal Reserve to raise war through issuing special government bonds, and received full support from many financial companies including Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs. Even arms giants such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Resin, and Northrop also agreed to the federal government for credit, but the money was eventually repaid by the federal government with taxes. In the case of severe economic downturn, the federal government's tax revenue has shrunk significantly and tax cuts have to stimulate domestic consumption. Not to mention spending $1200 billion in half a year, it would be good to be able to exchange the debt for the next ten years.

Of course, there is no solution.

White House financial policy advisers have made suggestions to offset federal government debts by issuing more currencies in the next decade to avoid the impact of tax increases on the economy.

The question is that there must be a prerequisite for additional currency issuance: the United States is still a unique and unparalleled superpower in the world.

To have this premise, the United States has only one choice: to win this war.

It is obvious that if the United States loses, the consequences will be unimaginable.

Perhaps in the short term, the United States' world hegemony will not be challenged. Even if China is very strong, it will be difficult for it to challenge the United States' global hegemony in the short term, because it is definitely not the army that maintains the United States' global hegemony, but the world's most powerful navy and air force. It is difficult for China to build a powerful navy that can compete for sea control globally with the United States Navy in the short term, and it will be impossible to shake the United States' hegemony. With a strong army alone, China can at most have an impact on surrounding areas that is far more than the United States.

The question is that the additional issuance of currencies in the United States is not a short-term impact, but a long-term impact.

How long will this impact last? It is not determined by war or by national strength, but by technology, that is, when a technological revolution like information technology can occur, allowing technology to promote productivity and digest incremental issuance of currencies.

Obviously, this is not a question that politicians can decide.

In this way, if the United States issues more currency and loses this war, it is possible that it will bear a heavy debt burden in the next few decades and cannot invest too much in other areas, especially crucial areas, to be surpassed by the rapidly rising challengers.

From another perspective, this is the key reason why China actively participates in this war.

In these decades, China not only has enough time to build a navy with global combat capabilities, but also can invest more in crucial areas, such as cutting-edge science and basic science, shake the United States' hegemony, and ultimately gain the basic strength to challenge the United States.

Apart from China, other ambitious powers will not miss such a good opportunity.

It can even be said that even the allies of the United States will take this opportunity to establish their own businesses. For example, Japan will no longer regard the United States as the main backer of national security, but will actively seek national defense capabilities and gain military strength commensurate with its economic strength. Europe will not be willing to be the second-in-command. France and Germany will definitely take this opportunity to vigorously promote the process of EU integration and work hard to build a superpower that can match the United States.

It can be imagined that to reach this point, the United States will not only be the only overlord, but also face many challenges.

The question is, if you don’t do this, are there any other options?

Objectively speaking, the ideal choice is to end the war in a decent way before losing the war, so as to avoid falling into the abyss that will never be restored.

However, if you want to make this choice, in addition to the United States, you also have to look at China's expression.

The United States provoked a war, but it was impossible to end the war alone.

As long as China refuses to engage in a ceasefire negotiation, the United States will not be able to end the war in a decent way.

Now, the question returns to the starting point, that is, how to make China agree to a ceasefire negotiation.

Strauss made a suggestion, that is, when he actively proposed to conduct a ceasefire negotiation, actively prepare for the second battle. If China does not intend to end the war through negotiation, the coalition forces must make a difference on the battlefield and use a victory to bring China back to the negotiating table.

After adopting this suggestion, Lindberg convened a plenary meeting of senior officials in both military and political circles.
Chapter completed!