.Chapter 85: Heavy punch

Sometimes, it is not a good thing to imagine the enemy as too strong.

Although the United States has developed a familiar air defense system such as "Patriots" and has become unique to the world, the US military relies on active attacks more than any other army, that is, to eliminate the threat on the ground and prevent enemy fighters from taking off to fight.

Even if the enemy planes have been launched, the main force of the US military's air defense is also various advanced fighter jets, rather than air defense missiles.

This situation is not because the US military does not attach importance to air defense, but because the US military has never encountered a real opponent.

After World War II, even in the Korean War and Vietnam War, where the US military lost the worst, the air force of the opponent was very limited, and at most it could only carry out air defense in key areas, and it did not threaten the US ground forces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States' military advantage became more obvious. Not to mention bombing the US ground forces, there were not many opponents who could challenge the US military in the air. In the more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the US military had never encountered threatening air force. From the Gulf War to the Kosovo War, to the Afghan War and the Iraq War, US fighters and bombers have always dominated the sky and used bombs and missiles to eliminate the enemy on the ground.

Without an opponent, there is naturally no demand.

The choices made by the US military in f-22a and f-35 are enough to illustrate this issue.

At the beginning, the US military planned to purchase equal amounts of f-22a and replace f-15 one by one to counter the increasingly powerful Soviet Air Force. Before the development of f-22a, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US military suddenly found that there was no opponent that needed thousands of f-22a to defeat, and cut off more than half of the purchases. In the end, the number of f-22a purchases dropped sharply from the initial 600 to 187.

If the F-35 can be successfully put into service in 2015 and enter the large-scale mass production stage in 2017, the scale of the F-22a aircraft fleet will be reduced to 143.

Although F-22a has strong ground strike capabilities after several improvements, and the development cycle of F-35 has been extended repeatedly, and the procurement price is expected to rise again and again, the US military still puts resources on F-35, and the US Congress has repeatedly rejected the budget for increasing the purchase of F-22a.

In the eyes of the US military, even if there are only 143 F-22a, it is enough to defeat any opponent.

The problem is that not all places can deploy 143 F-22a. In many cases, the US military still has to let the F-15, which has been in service for more than 30 years, serve as the main force.

In the Western Pacific region, only three bases can deploy F-22a, namely Anderson Air Base in Guam, Kadena Air Base in Okinawa and Akigi Air Base in Japan.

Anderson Air Force Base is too far from North Korea and can only serve as a transfer site for F-22a.

In Kadena and Akigi, up to sixty F-22a can be deployed.

Can this little force support the entire air defense network?

The answer is obviously no. If the F-15c aircraft fleet was not deployed in South Korea, the coalition forces would have long lost their air superiority.

The strong sense of offensiveness made the US military aggressive in combat, fully and effectively utilized air supremacy, and also made the US military very passive in some special circumstances.

If the enemy cannot be eliminated on the ground, you have to duel with the enemy in the air.

This is the reality. The US military cannot bomb China's local air bases, and it will not be able to destroy the Volunteer Air Force on the ground.

Fighting for air supremacy with the Volunteer Army in the air, a limited number of air-control fighters has become the biggest shortcoming.

Betting all the bets on fighter jets makes the US military's ground air defense system look fragile.

Among the several tactics and theater air defense systems equipped by the US military, only the Patriot II air defense system developed during the Cold War was mainly air defense, while the Patriot III and the Patriot III developed after the end of the Cold War were mainly anti-missiles, and they mainly deal with ballistic missiles.

The air defense system that can deal with ballistic missiles is definitely very advanced, but the efficiency of using it to deal with cruise missiles is not necessarily very high.

First, the ability to resist saturation is not strong.

Because ballistic missiles can only be deployed on the ground, and the most advanced ballistic missiles must be carried and fired by vehicles, it is much more difficult to use ballistic missiles to perform saturation strikes than cruise missiles. Even China's Second Artillery Forces can fire fifty ballistic missiles into the same area at the same time, and the Air Force's bombers can fire hundreds of cruise missiles into the same area at the same time.

Tactical characteristics determine how strong anti-saturation strike capability is not required for the anti-missile system.

Secondly, the interceptor missile's xing ability is not suitable for attacking cruise missiles.

Whether it is the Patriot Third Missile or the interceptor, they all use kinetic energy warheads suitable for intercepting ballistic missiles, and pay more attention to high-altitude xing energy. The maximum firing height of the interceptor missile reaches 120 kilometers, and the maximum firing height of the Patriot Third Missile also reaches 40 kilometers. It is obviously not appropriate to use such an interceptor missile to deal with low-altitude penetration cruise missiles.

Finally, it is the deployment method of air defense systems.

Because there is no need to consider air threats, the Patriots three and systems use semi-maneuverable deployment platforms led by trailers. They do not have field maneuverability and are not only unable to follow the combat troops, but also have to be fixedly deployed on the firing position. As long as the US military loses air supremacy, even if it only temporarily loses air supremacy, these air defense systems will become the opponent's ideal hunting targets.

At this time of the battle, the US military can only passively respond.

In the direction of East Korea Bay, two F-15c aircraft groups were successively put into combat, and each fighter used six Aim-12obsp; because the e-2d and e-3d showed anti-ship missiles in time, the interception operation was quite smooth.

Within five minutes, the F-15c fired aim-12oc shot down most of the anti-ship missiles, and less than ten broke through the interceptor line of the fighter.

Before arriving at Yongxing Bay, these anti-ship missiles were intercepted by the Patriot system.

In the end, only three anti-ship missiles landed in Yongxing Bay, and were very far away from the temporary dock where the transport ships were docked.

The real threat is not the anti-ship missiles fired by fighters, but the heavy anti-ship missiles fired by bombers hundreds of kilometers away.

Although the US commander urgently used four F-15cs and four F-15cs with ammunition in the first round of interception, he also achieved good results, with a hit rate of up to 80%, but for 160 anti-ship missiles, it is not harmful to lose more than a dozen.

After the fighter exits, the theater air defense system will appear.

At this time, the C missile group has not yet lowered its flight altitude and is still flying at an altitude of 15,000 meters. Only after the target is forty kilometers, that is, the bomb-mounted radar locks the target, will C climb again, dive down from a height of 30,000 meters, and rush towards the target at a 3 Mach.

This attack method is more suitable for dealing with aircraft carrier combat groups.

When developing C, the main air defense missile of the US aircraft carrier battle group was the "Standard" II air defense missile with a maximum shooting height of only 25 kilometers. Neither "Standard" III nor "Standard" Six was released. Letting anti-ship missiles enter from a height of 30,000 meters not only avoid "Standard" II, but also attack surface ships at an almost vertical angle, making it difficult for all air defense systems on the warship to function.

However, when facing high-altitude penetration, which mainly deals with ballistic missiles, is of little significance.

After the successful development of the "Standard" three, the team realized this problem. The successor models of C, namely C2 and C3, increased the low-altitude and high-surgency capabilities, and C3 is also equipped with tactical data links, which can provide tactical information for low-altitude and high-altitude missiles.

Unfortunately, these two types of anti-ship missiles have not yet been finalized and mass-produced.

Facing heavy anti-ship missiles that are much larger, much slower, and much lower in height than ballistic missile warheads, the interception efficiency is amazing.

Within three minutes, the two systems fired six batches of interceptor bombs one after another.

Before approaching Yongxing Bay, C was shot down dozens of them.

For example, the biggest problem is that it cannot intercept C, but that it has too few missiles. One interception system only has six sets of launchers and seventy-two missiles. When intercepting missiles with two-on-one method, the two systems can only intercept up to seventy-two missiles.

As anti-ship missiles locked in the target and began to climb to a height of 30,000 meters, the US military's "Patriot" three-type tactical air defense system also entered the battle.

The maximum shooting height of the Patriot Three Type reaches forty kilometers, intercepting bsp; just like that, the biggest problem with the Patriot Three Type is that there is insufficient ammunition reserve. There are only 64 interceptors in the four sets of launchers in a system, because most of the time, the Patriot Three Type is matched with the Patriot Two Souls, so a set of interceptors only has 32 interceptors.

When C dives, Patriot Type II also entered the battle.

This is the last opportunity to intercept anti-ship missiles. There is no defense system on the transport ship. After the anti-ship missile breaks through the Patriot II air defense network, it will hit the transport ship.

There are not many Cs with the opportunity to face the "Patriot" type 2, and there will be no more than twenty.

However, the interception efficiency of "Patriot" Type 2 is not very good.

When the dive stage enters the C-energy body separates, the warhead dives faster, the radar reflects the cross-section, and the separated missile body also becomes the bait for the warhead.

At this time, there are still thousands of bsp in the air; it is obviously very difficult to find the real target among so many "baits" and guide the missile to hit the real target.

At the last moment, less than ten Cs shot down by the Patriot Type II, and more than ten anti-ship missiles successfully broke through the air defense system.

These anti-ship missiles are absolutely a fatal threat to transport ships docked next to the dock.

One C can sink a 10,000-ton destroyer, and up to three C can scrap a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier.

Although the displacement of transport ships is much larger than that of destroyers, the construction standards of merchant ships are much lower than those of warships.

As long as it is hit by C, any 50,000-ton merchant ship will turn into scrap copper and iron. If there is flammable and explosive cargo on the ship, the consequences will be even more unimaginable.

Most of the transport ships parked in Yongxing Bay are loaded with flammable and explosive cargo.

When the US military stared at the smashed missile, it was not known that there was still a "missile" that had not fallen.
Chapter completed!