It can be said that if Nauru is occupied, the situation will be very different.

For example, anti-submarine patrol aircraft can be deployed in Nauru to monitor the waters north of the Fiji Islands.

Because Ponape Island is too far from the Fiji Islands, Mu Haoyang could only deploy anti-submarine patrol aircraft in the Solomon Islands, squeezing limited ground resources.

What's more serious is that it disrupts front-line deployment.

In response to this problem, Mu Haoyang came up with a relatively effective solution, namely, let the Air Force deploy strategic early warning aircraft to the Solomon Islands.

Although the strategic early warning aircraft is not better than the anti-submarine patrol aircraft when searching for sea surface targets. The radar equipped by the strategic early warning aircraft is mainly used to search for air targets and its sea detection capabilities are not much better than the radar on the anti-submarine patrol aircraft, on a complex battlefield, the mission elasticity of the strategic early warning aircraft is more prominent, that is, it can search for sea surface and air targets at the same time and command other aircraft activities.

Of course, this inevitably leads to the strategic early warning aircraft taking huge combat risks.

You should know that strategic early warning aircraft are the most valuable combat aircraft in the Air Force, and the cost is even greater than that of strategic bombers.

When the war broke out, the Chinese Air Force had only less than 40 strategic early warning aircraft, and the US Air Force had only about fifty strategic early warning aircraft equipped. By 2054, the number of strategic early warning aircraft of the Chinese Air Force increased to more than one hundred, and increased at a rate of four per month.

It can be said that this is already the maximum production capacity of strategic early warning aircraft.

You should know that as the performance of various combat aircraft is rapidly improving, the Air Force's performance requirements for strategic early warning aircraft have also increased.

At that time, the Chinese Air Force demanded as many as 180 strategic early warning aircraft.

The main thing is that when facing many threats, the use of early warning aircraft has changed. The tasks that were previously only needed to complete with one strategic early warning aircraft are now required. On the mainland battlefield, the Air Force has adopted a brand new early warning aircraft deployment tactic, forming a group of three strategic early warning aircraft, one of which is the leader aircraft, and the three early warning aircraft are flying in a form of form, with a distance of between fifty kilometers and one hundred kilometers. The wingman sends the detected air information to the chief aircraft through a high-speed tactical data link, which is processed centrally by the chief aircraft, and then allocates the processed information to the wingman to guide the nearest fighter aircraft to fight.

The biggest feature of this tactic is that it greatly extends the detection distance in passive conditions and improves the detection accuracy.

To put it simply, the strategic early warning aircraft that form formation flight actually forms the most basic passive radar detection matrix.

Actual combat has long proved that passive radar is the best way to detect stealth aircraft.

However, when only one strategic early warning aircraft is used, the maximum detection distance of stealth aircraft is difficult to exceed 300 kilometers. In terms of tactics, early warning aircraft needs to provide a detection area of ​​about 500 kilometers to ensure that its air defense fighter jets can intercept incoming enemy aircraft in time.

After forming the aerial detection base array, the passive detection distance of the strategic early warning aircraft for stealth fighters exceeded 500 kilometers.

It can be said that it is this tactical change that has helped the Chinese Air Force firmly grasp the air supremacy on the mainland battlefield and provided strong support for ground forces.

The problem is that the Air Force's demand for strategic early warning aircraft has also increased significantly.

In fact, one hundred and eighty aircraft were just the most basic quantity demands. At that time, the Air Force needed a more advanced strategic early warning aircraft, and it was clearly required that such strategic early warning aircraft must be equipped with powerful computers, act as a long aircraft for the aircraft group, and process massive air information.

The development work in this area has begun. The new early warning machine is based on the dy-1 large electric transport aircraft and is equipped with a supercomputer with a floating-point computing speed of ten trillion times per second. The first engineering prototype has begun to be manufactured and is expected to be mass-produced in early 2055.

At that time, the second super strategic early warning aircraft was also under development. The carrier was dy-2. It was not only equipped with a supercomputer with more powerful performance, but also had almost unlimited battery life. That is, its power supply system was a small fusion reactor with an integrated mass of 220 tons.

According to the Air Force's plan, these two super early warning aircraft will become the future air command centers.

Of course, these are all beautiful ideas and did not become reality in 2054.

Mu Haoyang asked the Air Force to send strategic early warning aircraft to the Solomon Islands, and there were more long-term considerations, that is, in the subsequent fleet operations, these early warning aircraft will guide air combat.

Of course, in Mu Haoyang's view, the threat in the direction of the Coral Sea is not great, and the US military is most likely to bypass the Fiji Islands.

With the speed of the US fleet, it would only take one more day to sail.

Of course, France may also adopt more risky tactics, such as using anti-submarine patrol aircraft to open up a safe channel west of the Fiji Islands.

There may be more extreme situations, that is, the US fleet heads directly north from the Tasman Sea into the Coral Sea.

All in all, French has many options.

When it comes to the issue of war or not fighting, the choice is in French's hands. Mu Haoyang can do it only to try his best to make the deployment, and then let Gong Jifei and Tong Shaoyun wait patiently.

In the next few days, Mu Haoyang's judgment is becoming a reality.

The most obvious sign is that since June 14th, the US military has reduced its combat efforts over the Coral Sea and reduced the number of fighter jets. However, according to previous statistics, there should be about 1,200 US fighter jets deployed in Australia. In other words, the US military has not lost its combat capability, but has not continued to compete with the Chinese Air Force for air supremacy in the Coral Sea for other reasons.

This other factor is obviously related to the coming US fleet.

According to Mu Haoyang's judgment, if French intends to lead a fleet into the Coral Sea, they will first have to destroy the air base on the Solomon Islands. The US Air Force has done its best and has not achieved its goal. Therefore, French will definitely adopt a surprise attack tactic, such as letting the US Air Force deploy with all its strength to attract Chinese fighters to take off the air, and the US fleet will take this opportunity to launch a surprise attack.

Of course, it may also be reversed, that is, the fleet is used as bait and the Air Force is responsible for the raid mission.

If the US military is fully prepared for combat, it is possible to take a two-pronged approach, and the fleet and the air force are dispatched at the same time to ensure that the combat objectives are achieved.

No matter what, the US fleet will definitely come, and the question is just when and in which direction it will come.

At that time, Mu Haoyang made a special arrangement: to ask Sima Wen to strengthen his offensive efforts on Guadalcanal Island, causing greater casualties and losses to the US military.
Chapter completed!