Elizabeth, Roosevelt, Churchill and others all understood very well that this must not allow this to happen.+ Now Britain and the United States have gathered 2.88 million troops in Britain, including more than one million British troops, 800,000 US troops, and hundreds of thousands of other allies. This allows Britain and the United States to choose any tactics calmly. Roosevelt and Churchill discussed this for this.

Elizabeth was not involved in the secret discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill. Churchill invited Roosevelt to his prime minister's house and was alone in a secret room. At the same time, he summoned several major military supervisors, who would discuss with the US generals who came with Roosevelt to discuss with the British U.S. military generals who came with Roosevelt.

In the UK, Alexander and Montgomery were Alexander and Montgomery, while in the US, Marshall and Eisenhower, the four of them discussed publicly, and then Roosevelt and Churchill made the final ruling, which strategy to choose.

This meeting cannot be completed in one or two days. Once it is decided, it is related to the future destiny of Britain and the United States, and we must be cautious. Whether Britain and the United States choose to sit on the mountain and watch the battle of tigers, or immediately launch an operation to land in France when the Kursk Battle is deadlocked. No one knows the decision of Britain and the United States.

...

In April 1943, Li Mo formulated his initial combat plan. For this assault, Li Mo expected to point to the bottom of the wide protrusion in the Kursk region. The reason for choosing this protrusion was because it was located between Belgorod and Orel, which was just within the German defense line.

Therefore, for the German army, the Soviet military deployment in the Kursk protrusion would have the possibility of threatening the coordinated operations of the German Central Army and the Southern Army. It then developed to use it as a breakthrough to invade Ukraine. In order to eliminate this huge protrusion, the German army would adopt a clamp-shaped combat method:

The 4th Tank Army in Li Mo's Southern Army Group (formerly the Don River Army Group) formed the surrounding right-wing group, and the 9th Army in Kruger's Central Army Group became the left-wing group. Finally, relying on the strength of the two armies, the giant outcrop of the Soviet army located 75 miles into the German position, and restored the front line in 1942. Therefore, if this attack is successful, a large number of Soviet divisions can be annihilated and greatly weakened the Soviet offensive power, thus making the German army in a favorable position on the Eastern Front battlefield.

Li Mo's original intention has evolved from relying on assault forces to consuming the Soviet forces in the Kursk region to trying to annihilate the Voronezh Front and the Central Front in Kursk at one time using encirclement tactics. If possible, it can also evolve into an encirclement of the grasslands on its periphery and the Bryanque Front, which completely destroyed the main force of the Soviet army. The consequences of this have made an assault with limited purpose designed as a decisive attack.

On May 4, 1943, an offensive plan code-named "Fortress" was officially launched, but in fact it was not much different from the combat plan formulated in April. Judging from the military deployment of the German army, the two clamp arms located in this clamp-shaped offensive were the 9th Army of Admiral Model, who attacked from the north. Admiral Hort's 4th Tank Army would be responsible for the offensive task in the south. In the first echelon, Hort had 8 armored divisions and Model had 7 armored divisions.

In addition, a considerable number of infantry divisions were needed to participate in the attack. However, from a strategic point of view, the "Fortress" campaign was purely an irresponsible gamble. For this offensive, the German army had to use almost all the battle reserves. Therefore, the consequences of the battle would be unimaginable once the battle failed.

Before this, Li Mo had repeatedly insisted that if an offensive plan must be adopted, an attack must be launched in early May, that is, when the mud in spring was just dry and the Soviet army had not had time to adjust its military deployment. The commander of the 9th Army, Model, advocated a temporary suspension of the operation and wait for the arrival of a large number of tank reinforcements. Li Mo adopted Model's opinion and slowed the date of launching the attack until May, but finally delayed until May 4, with 12 armored divisions of the two attack troops in the north and south respectively.

This is almost 70% of the German armored division on the Eastern Front. Li Mo is not afraid of gamblers. Germany has 3,800 tanks of various types, while the Soviet army has 5,000 to 7,000 tanks, but Li Mo is confident. The combat plan formulated by Li Mo in the early stage is just smoke bombs. The real combat plan has been in Li Mo's mind. Hundreds of excellent combat staff have been secretly transported to the "Eagle's Nest". They mainly improve the overall combat plan designed by Li Mo.

Regarding Li Mo's suggestion to launch an attack in early May, many people have also raised such questions: Can the German army achieve effective results by taking an attack in May? Some people suggested that Hitler gather troops immediately and delay the attack time a little, but Li Mo immediately explained a few situations to Hitler:

The original concept of the entire "fortress" combat plan was to attack before the enemy was completed. At the same time, this was inevitable. The longer the German attack time was delayed, the greater the threat faced by the troops of the southern army group in the Donets-Mius River out of the outcrop, because all their armored forces had been withdrawn. This situation also occurred in the Anel protruding area where the 9th Army of the Central Army Group jumped out of the base. Therefore, the longer the delay, the greater the threat to these areas the Soviet army would be.

The situation on the southern front from April to May was still more beneficial to the German army. The German army on the southern front did not suffer serious losses in the Kharkiv counterattack, and many front-line German divisions maintained strong combat effectiveness. Within 10 days after the end of the Kharkiv Battle, the industry had recovered most of its strength. However, the Soviet army did not have these conditions. Although they exceeded the German army in the number of reserves, the gap between the two sides was small in terms of the number of technical weapons.

By April 10, the German army had deployed very powerful military forces in the surrounding areas of Kursk, including about 1.7 million people, 16,000 cannons and mortars, 3,800 tanks and assault artillery and 3,500 combat aircraft. Therefore, the German army had already had a considerable military force at this time.

Although the delay in the attack time can enable the German armored division to obtain more new tanks to enhance its strength, the Soviet power in the Kursk region grew faster at this time. In early April, the Soviet reinforcements were not yet fully in place, and it was also the most important one - at this time, the Soviet fortifications near Kursk were far from being completed and could not withstand a fierce attack at all. However, if the German army postponed the offensive for one or two months, the possibility of completing the task would be much smaller.
Chapter completed!