But what is worse is the following development. Hitler designated Norway as the battlefield of the Supreme Command, which was not the right to inquire about the Army Headquarters, and that was just the first step to disrupt land operations. From then on, almost all other battlefields gradually became private property of the Supreme Command. In the end, only the Eastern Front still belonged to the Army Headquarters, but the Army Commander-in-Chief was already the commander-in-chief. Therefore, the influence of the Chief of Staff on other battlefields was pitifully small.

Similarly, the commander-in-chief of the other two branches of the military had no effect on the issues of grand strategy. The Chief of the Army had no say in the total distribution of the army's forces, and often did not know which troops and materials would be sent to other battlefields. In this environment, conflicts between the combat office of the Supreme Command and the General Staff of the Army were inevitable. Hitler seemed to have intentionally caused such conflicts so that at any time he could have the right to decide. Naturally, this harsh organization was doomed to collapse the entire senior military leader. Hitler had an additional consequence of his own willpower and military capabilities, which was that he used individual hand-tied orders to directly command the subordinate troops, and this situation became increasingly serious.

A characteristic is often emphasized in the German military leadership system, that is, the hope that commanders at all levels can take the initiative and dare to take responsibility. All measures are ideal to give full play to this characteristic. Therefore, in principle, the "training" of higher commands and the orders of middle and lower commands are limited to the "specified" tasks for their subordinate units. As for how to perform designated tasks, it is the affairs of the subordinate commanders themselves, and the superiors should not interfere. The German army is often able to defeat the enemy, and this system of handling orders is a major reason, because the orders of the opponent are often very detailed and limit the actions of all subordinate commanders. Unless it is absolutely necessary, the German army always takes the principle of not invading the authority of the subordinate units as much as possible.

However, Hitler believed that sitting in the office himself had a better understanding of the situation than the commander on the front line. He ignored the situation marked on his too detailed map of the situation, and in fact he could not keep up with the situation. And from such a long distance, he could not judge which action on the front line was suitable and necessary.

He gradually developed a habit of using handwritten to interfere with the actions of the army group, army group and lower-level units, which was completely unrelated to the scope he should care about. Although he had never been interfered within Guderian's own command in the past, when Guderian went from Fettbusk to Rostov, he met Marshal Kruger at a train station in the middle, but he once gave Guderian a warning in advance. He said that in the Central Army Group, he had to discuss any action with more than one battalion of troops in advance with an unbearable interference. Although Guderian finally did not suffer such unbearable interference in the future, due to Hitler's meddling, there had been enough conflicts between Guderians and the Supreme Command.

This personal command of Hitler usually only has an hindering effect on command and combat. On the contrary, Hitler was extremely reluctant to issue long-term combat training orders. The more he regarded the principle of "being desperate at all costs" as the key point of his policy, he became less willing to issue long-term commands. Because he no longer trusted his subordinates, he was afraid that such long-term commands would give them freedom of movement and do what he did not want to do. However, the result was that all leadership roles were lost. After a long time, even an army group could not act without the command of the command. Guderians often recalled the situation of Guderians in Crimea, when Guderians had sufficient freedom of movement.

There are many records that Hitler's attitude was very rough, sometimes with foam in his mouth, and sometimes even bite the carpet. Of course, he sometimes loses his self-control, but when Guderian was present, he only saw him get angry once, which was his quarrel with Halder. It was obvious that Hitler was sent by people. In terms of Guderian's personal experience, he was able to maintain the politeness he deserved. Even if Guderians had conflicted opinions, he never blushed.

If Hitler was a psychologist, he had a way to convince him and make him accept his views for anyone who came to see him. In addition, he knew of the motivations of anyone who came to see him, and had already prepared a theory of defense. He had a special ability to convince others to accept his own ideas, whether it was true or false. Especially some officers who had just returned from the front line had no idea about him and were more susceptible to his deception. In this case, when this person set out, he only wanted to tell Hitler the truth about the front line, but when he came back, he was completely convinced by Hitler and was more confident.

When Guderian was appointed commander-in-chief of the army group, he often debated with Hitler for the sake of combat. What impressed Guderian the most was that he was incredibly resilient when defending his own point of view. Almost for several hours, sometimes his guests would achieve his goals, but most of them returned empty-handed, and the best comfort was nothing more than an empty promise. Among the people Guderian knew, no one had the same endurance as him in such a discussion. The maximum time for a debate with a front-line commander was at best, but General Chazler Chaizler often had several days to argue for Hitler to take necessary actions. When this debate was underway, Guderians were always used to asking Chazler how many "rounds" they had reached.

Furthermore, the reasons used by Hitler to defend his views (including purely military as Guderian refers here) are often not easy to dismiss. Especially in any discussion of combat intentions, almost no one can make an absolutely correct prediction of the consequences of the events in question. In war, nothing can be determined, whether it is said or done.

When Hitler himself felt that his strategic opinions could not give anyone any good impression, he would immediately look for reasons in the political or economic field. Because his knowledge of political and economic situations was incomparable to any front-line commander, his debates were usually more justified at this time. As a last resort, the Guderians had to insist that if he did not agree with Guderians' suggestions or requests made to him, there would definitely be bad consequences in the military. Therefore, they would be badly affected in the political and economic aspects.

On the contrary, although he is unwilling to accept the request, he often shows that he is a good listener and sometimes he can make objective discussions.

Such a fatalist dictator was thinking about his political ambitions and lived in his belief in "destiny", so it was naturally difficult to have any intimate relationships with his military generals. It was obvious that Hitler was least interested in personal factors. In his opinion, all human beings were just a tool to achieve their political ambitions. He himself had no emotional connection with German soldiers.

[Please collect it, brothers, about famous figures in World War II, Falling leaves will not make up random things. They will definitely use history as the criterion and facts as the basis. The historical figures that have to be explained in this book will also be explained in the free chapters.]
Chapter completed!