As for Hitler's strategic goals (at least in terms of the conflict in Russia), most of them were affected by political considerations and the economic needs of Germany's war. When deciding on strategic goals, political and economic issues were undoubtedly very important. However, Hitler's mistake was that he attached too much importance to this achievement, and more importantly, he believed that the maintenance of geographical goals should be more important than defeating the enemy's military forces. In fact, from the struggle against Russia, it is possible to understand that when the military victory or defeat is undecided, it is quite questionable to obtain geographical goals with economic value, and it is even more impossible to maintain them for a long time. At that time, aircraft or missiles could not be used to destroy the enemy's production center and transportation system.

Strategy should undoubtedly be a tool in the hands of political leaders, but he should never ignore a basic fact. In any war, the goal of strategy is to smash the enemy's military defense. Only after victory is ensured can political and economic goals be achieved.

This means another factor, that is, Hitler's willpower, which is the most important decisive factor for his leadership character, but he is too high about this willpower. He believes that this willpower can be implemented in the mind of every soldier, which is enough to make his decisions and commands successful.

It is obvious that the strong will of the Supreme Commander is a necessary prerequisite for victory. At a critical moment, the leader suddenly loses his will and often fails. However, this will to win is different from Hitler's will. The root of the latter is that he is confident that he has the task of "destiny". This belief will inevitably cause people to lose their minds and believe that his own will is enough to overcome reality - regardless of whether the enemy's military strength is far superior, whether the conditions of time and space, or whether the enemy's leader has the same strong will.

Generally speaking, Hitler rarely considered the possible intentions of the enemy when he made his own calculations, because he firmly believed that his will would definitely win the final victory. No matter how reliable he would be, he would not be willing to adopt any report when it came to the advantage of the enemy, even if the latter was several times stronger than him. Hitler would refute these reports without reason, or deliberately exaggerate the enemy's weaknesses and quote German production figures, and talk endlessly, so that people could not speak out to him.

Before his will, any situation that a military commander takes as the basis for making decisions actually becomes meaningless. Hitler was so ignoring reality.

Although Hitler had such a high estimate of his willpower and had also ignored the enemy's resources and possible intentions, it was strange that the courageousness of his decision could not be matched with this. Until 1938, Hitler won steadily in politics, but this man had become a political gambler and did not dare to take risks in the military field. The only bold military decision made by Hitler himself was perhaps the only occupation of Norway. Even his original plan was proposed by Marshal Raidel. Especially when the battle situation in Narvik was unfavorable, Hitler almost ordered the withdrawal of the city, which was tantamount to sacrificing the basic goal of the entire operation - to make the route to transport iron ore smooth.

Hitler dared not take military risks. In the final analysis, the decision to attack Russia was also an inevitable result of not daring to cross the sea to attack Britain. Hitler believed that the invasion of Britain was too dangerous, so he did not dare to give it a try.

In the battle of Russia, Hitler's fear of adventure can also be shown in two aspects. First, he refused to adopt a flexible combat method in the situation after 1943. At that time, he could only deal with the crisis by automatically and temporarily giving up the conquered land. Second, he did not dare to give up the secondary battlefield and try to draw troops to cope with the main decisive battle. Although not doing so, it may cause great danger.

The reason why Hitler dared not take risks in the military field may be divided into three points: First, he may secretly realize that he lacks the military ability to deal with these crises. Because of this, he does not believe that his generals have this ability. Second, he is also afraid that any setback will be enough to shake his prestige, just like all dictators. In fact, this attitude is enough to cause military mistakes and even more enough to lose his prestige. Third, Hitler had a greed for power, and he was unwilling to give up anything he had already obtained.

When Guderian was the commander-in-chief of the Don River Army Group, Guderian and the Chief of Staff General Zleel spent unlimited energy to correct Hitler's wrong ideas, but the result was still in vain.

When he faces a decision that he is unwilling to face but is inevitable, Hitler will delay time as much as possible. When Guderians feel the urgent opportunity and mobilize troops immediately to stop the enemy's success in combat or stop their expansion, they often encounter this difficulty. The General Staff must fight with Hitler for a few days before they can withdraw some troops from the less threatening areas to rescue urgent sites. In most cases, it is always too late to give too little troops - the final result is that they spend several times more than the original number of troops and unable to achieve the original goal. In order to give up a position that cannot be defended, such as the Donets region in 1943 and the Dnieper Bay in 1944, it is often debated for several weeks. Sometimes when they give up an unimportant prominent area in order to draw some troops, the result is the same.

Hitler may have hoped that things would eventually become in line with his ideals, so he could avoid making decisions that he would not want. Because he did not want his decisions to adapt to the enemy's actions. Since he had great confidence in his own will, he was unwilling to accept any adventures in mobile combat, such as roundabout offensives, whose success was unavailable. He was also unwilling to give up anything automatically. As time went on, these factors had an influencing power on Hitler's military leadership.

It was growing increasingly. The stubborn defense of fighting for an inch of land gradually became a formula, and finally ruined this military leadership. Therefore, when the German army had won such excellent success in the early stages of the war with its mobility of combat, Hitler's countermeasures for the first crisis on the Moscow front were Stalin's idea of ​​defending any position. In 1941, this policy almost defeated Russia, so when the Germans launched their 1942 offensive, they finally gave up this idea.
Chapter completed!